National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness

Final Report 524

Development of a Highway Safety Fundamental Course

by

Xiaoduan Sun University of Louisiana at Lafayette



Supported by:





1. Report No.		2. Government Accession No.	3. Recipient's
FHWA/LA.14/524			Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle	foty Fundamental	5. Report Date	
Development of a Highway Sat	lety Fundamental	May 2015	
Course		6. Performing Organization Code	
		LTRC Project Number: 13-2SA	
		State Project Number: 30000761	
7. Author(s)		8. Performing Organization Report No.	
Xiaoduan Sun, Ph.D., P.E.			
9. Performing Organization Name and Address		10. Work Unit No.	
······································			
Civil Engineering Department			
University of Louisiana at Lafay	vatta	11. Contract or Grant No.	
	elle		
Lafayette, LA 70504 12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address		13. Type of Report and Period Covered	
National Center for Intermodal Tra	nsportation for Economic	Final Report	
Competitiveness (NCITEC)	isportation for Leononne	July 1, 2012 to December 31, 201	2
Mississippi State University		July 1, 2012 to December 51, 201	5
260 McCain			
Miss. State, MS 39762		14. Sponsoring Agency Code	
Wilss. State, Wis 59762			
Louisiana Department of Transpor	tation and Development		
P.O. Box 94245	tation and Development		
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9245 15. Supplementary Notes			
Conducted in Cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Innovative			
Technology Administration (RIT			
16. Abstract			
		e 1960s, it has become an increasingly u	
		vay Safety Strategy and by state DOTS,	
to have a workforce that fully understands the fundamentals of highway safety. One way to ensure such an adequate			
workforce is to develop a college level course to educate students. Although the NCHRP Project 17-40, "Model			
Curriculum for Highway Safety Core Competencies," has produced training materials on highway safety, it targets a broad audience "that consists of road safety professionals at all levels of government, as well as representatives of the private			
		safety, public health, psychology, statis	
		course title "Road Safety 101" clearly s	
is not intended for a systematic safety of			nows that it
is not intended for a systematic safety education in the neid of engineering.			
This project developed a teaching package for safety fundamentals for undergraduate students and graduate students in			
		way safety, basic safety concepts, safety	
data, fundamental statistics, development of safety models, safety predictive models in HSM, and safety evaluation.			
Accordingly, seven lecture notes were developed along with homework assignments, quizzes, and exams.			
The developed course materials can also be used in the engineering continuing education on the topic of roadway safety			
and in roadway safety training workshops for a broad audience who are involved in highway safety from not just			
engineering, but also education and enforcement.			
17 Key Words		18 Distribution Statement	
17. Key Words		18. Distribution Statement Unrestricted. This document is available	through the
17. Key Words		Unrestricted. This document is available National Technical Information Service, S	
17. Key Words 19. Security Classif. (of this report)	20. Security Classif. (of this page)	Unrestricted. This document is available	

Development of a Highway Safety Fundamental Course

by

Xiaoduan Sun, Ph.D., P.E. Civil Engineering Department University of Louisiana at Lafayette Lafayette, LA 70504

SIO No. 30000761

conducted for

National Center for Intermodal Transportation for Economic Competitiveness (NCITEC)

The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and the accuracy of the information presented herein. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation University Transportation Centers Program, in the interest of information exchange. The U.S. Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.

May 2015

ABSTRACT

Although the need for road safety education was first recognized in the 1960s, it has become an increasingly urgent issue in recent years. To fulfill the hefty goal set up by the AASHTO Highway Safety Strategy and by state DOTS, it is critical to have a workforce that fully understands the fundamentals of highway safety. One way to ensure such an adequate workforce is to develop a college level course to educate students. Although the NCHRP Project 17-40, "Model Curriculum for Highway Safety Core Competencies," has produced training materials on highway safety, it targets a broad audience "that consists of road safety professionals at all levels of government, as well as representatives of the private sector and non-profits, from the fields of: traffic engineering, highway safety, public health, psychology, statistics, law enforcement, economics, planning, public policy, and education." The course title "Road Safety 101" clearly shows that it is not intended for a systematic safety education in the field of engineering.

This project developed a teaching package for safety fundamentals for undergraduate students and graduate students in civil engineering. The course covers seven topics: introduction to highway safety, basic safety concepts, safety related data, fundamental statistics, development of safety models, safety predictive models in HSM, and safety evaluation. Accordingly, seven lecture notes were developed along with homework assignments, quizzes, and exams.

The developed course materials can also be used in the engineering continuing education on the topic of roadway safety and in roadway safety training workshops for a broad audience who are involved in highway safety from not just engineering, but also education and enforcement.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The help and guidance from the project review committee is appreciated. Special appreciation goes to the project manager, Kirk M. Zeringue, for his diligent work to ensure the project executed successfully with intended results.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xii
INTRODUCTION	1
OBJECTIVE	3
SCOPE	5
METHODOLOGY	7
Review	7
Teaching Package Development	
Comprehensive Safety Course Syllabus	
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS	15
CONCLUSIONS	17
RECOMMENDATIONS	19
ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS	21
REFERENCES	23
APPENDIX A: TEACHING PACKAGE	25
APPENDIX B: EVALUATION PACKAGE	465
APPENDIX C: SYLLABUS FOR COMPREHENSIVE SAFETY COURSE	477

LIST OF TABLES

9

INTRODUCTION

Although the need for road safety education was first recognized in the 1960s, it has become an increasingly urgent issue in recent years. To fulfill the hefty goal set up by the AASHTO Strategic Highway Safety Plan (cutting traffic fatalities in half by 2020) and by the state (Destination Zero Death by Louisiana Strategy Highway Safety Plan), it is critical to have a workforce that fully understands the fundamentals of highway safety. The fundamental knowledge of roadway safety has evolved during the two decades. The first edition of Highway Safety Manual (HSM) documented the latest fundamental knowledge on highway safety. Ensuring that newly-entering engineering students are equipped with a sufficient background in highway safety is critical to sustaining the progress of reducing the number of crashes in recent years. Therefore, one way to ensure such an adequate workforce is to develop a college level course to educate students, which has not been done in the past.

Although the NCHRP Project 17-40, "Model Curriculum for Highway Safety Core Competencies," has produced training materials on highway safety, it targets a broad audience "that consists of road safety professionals at all levels of government, as well as representatives of the private sector and non-profits, from the fields of: traffic engineering, highway safety, public health, psychology, statistics, law enforcement, economics, planning, public policy, and education". The course title "Road Safety 101" clearly shows that it is not intended for a systematic safety education in the field of engineering *[1]*.

Preparing engineering students for future work in highway safety is particularly important in this region because of a poor performance in highway safety. As shown in Figure 1, the traffic fatality rate (fatalities per 100 million Vehicle-Miles-Traveled) in Louisiana and Mississippi has been persistently higher than the national average, although the fatality rate has been reduced over the last several years [2]. Traffic crashes bring a hugely negative impact not only on public health but also on sustainable economic development due to lost productivities, lost wages and salaries, medical and long-term care cost, property damage, and travel delay. The need to improve highway safety is significant in this region.




Figure 1 Traffic fatality rate by year

Increasing the workforce short-and long-term competitiveness in highway safety in this region will help the sustainable economic development.

OBJECTIVE

The goal of this project was to develop much needed roadway safety fundamentals for undergraduate and graduate students for the NCITEC consortium universities. The developed course materials can be used for college education in a classroom setting or for workforce training in a workshop setting.

SCOPE

The scope of this project includes a teaching package for highway safety fundamentals, which can be used in a university setting or for an on-site job training program for engineers. The final product of the project will consist of the lecture notes and student assignments.

METHODOLOGY

Due to the nature of this project, three sections are included in this section of the report.

Review

Highway safety education and training have been recognized as an important step in reducing the number of crashes and crash severities. Currently, there are many professional training programs available in the United States. As part of NCHRP 20-70 project, Geni B. Bahar has identified a total of 184 training courses by various organizations *[3]*. The focus of these training programs varies by the targeted audience in the 4E areas.

F. Gross and P. Jovanis, working with the TRB Joint Subcommittee for Highway Safety Workforce Development, published a set of safety core competencies and learning objectives that outline the "fundamental knowledge and skills that should be possessed by all transportation safety professionals"[4]. The core competencies are as follows:

- 1. Understand the management of highway safety as a complex, multidisciplinary system;
- 2. Understand and be able to explain the history of highway and institutional settings in which safety management decisions are made;
- 3. Understand the origins and characteristics of traffic safety data and information systems to support decisions using a data-driven approach in managing highway safety;
- 4. Demonstrate the knowledge and skills to assess factors contributing to highway crashes, injuries, and fatalities, identify potential countermeasures linked to the contributing factors, apply countermeasures to user groups or sites with the promise of crash and injury reduction, and implement and evaluate the effectiveness of the countermeasures; and
- 5. Be able to develop, implement, and manage a highway safety management program.

The TRB Special Report 289 "Building the Road Safety Profession in the Public Sector" stated that [5]:

- Road safety is a major responsibility of governments at all levels;
- Road safety management must be guided by science and safety system perspective;
- Road safety management requires a talented and diverse workforce;
- Road safety professionals must possess a common body of knowledge and skills;

- Education and training for road safety are scarce;
- Career advancement in the road safety profession is limited;
- The need for road safety professionals is growing;
- More attention must be given to building the supply of safety professionals

Road Safety 101 was developed as a result of NCHRP 17-40 Project "Model Curriculum for Highway Safety Core Competencies." It is currently an online or on-site certificate training program aiming to teach the basics of road safety offered by the institutes affiliated with FHWA. This course enables users to understand the elements of successful road safety programs, identify contributing crash factors and how they interact as well as gain a better understanding of road safety data collection and systems [2].

After the publication of the first edition of the HSM, many professional training courses or programs quickly incorporated HSM content into training materials. Additionally, the HSM Online Overview became available free of charge through the National Highway Institute (NHI) website [6]. This course consisted of 13 self-paced informational modules that can be taken in any order, depending on the user's prior knowledge and experience, interest, and time available. The course includes an introduction of HSM terminology, examples of the Roadway Safety Management Process (HSM Part B) and Predictive Methods (HSM Part C), explains the relationship of crash modification factors (CMFs) to decision making and quantitative safety analysis, and human factors [7].

In addition to teaching roadway safety as part of a transportation engineering course, quite a few universities currently offer a full highway safety course in civil engineering with a focus on roadway engineering. The University of Louisiana at Lafayette started the course in 2009 as an elective course for undergraduate and graduate students. The comprehensive syllabus covered in the traditional highway safety course is described in the next section. Pennsylvania State University offers a highway safety course on human factors to expose the students to the breadth of issues related to safety and human factors in the highway transportation field. The course allows the students to gain experience in the recognition of problems, formulation of methodologies, analysis of data, and development of solutions.

Teaching Package Development

A detailed teaching package on the safety fundamentals was developed, which includes:

- 1. Lecture notes in PowerPoint presentation format
- 2. Homework assignment
- 3. Project assignment
- 4. Quizzes and exams

The content of the package covers the fundamental highway safety in the following topics:

- 1. Introduction to Highway Safety
- 2. Basic Safety Concepts
- 3. Safety Data
- 4. Fundamental Statistics
- 5. Development of Safety Models
- 6. Safety Predictive Models from Highway Safety Manual (HSM)
- 7. Safety Evaluation

The objectives and details for each topic are summarized in the following seven tables.

Subtopic	Objectives	Content
Traffic Crash—a global underemphasized problem	Be familiar with the gravity of the problem	 Crash statistics (global, U.S. and the state) Comparing traffic crashes with other types of fatalities
Impact of crashes on a society	Recognize the multidimensional aspects of safety	 Public health problem Economic problem Liability problem Social problem
Dissecting a crash	Identify influential and contributing factors to a crash and its severity	 Basic crash mechanism Haddon matrix How roadway, vehicle, and environmental conditions contribute to a crash occurrence and its severity

Table 1Introduction to roadway safety

Introduction to the 4E	Understand the	1.	Roadway users
approach	significance of the		characteristics
	4E approach	2.	Vehicles characteristics
		3.	Roadways characteristics
		4.	Environment
		5.	Emergency service

Table 2Basic safety concept

Subtopic	Objectives		Content
Defining Safety	Understand the	1.	How do customers define
	scientific definition		safety
	of safety	2.	Objective safety and
			subjective safety
		3.	Safety definition

Table 3 Safety data

Subtopic	Objectives	Content
Safety Related Data	Understand how the	1. Regression to the mean
	crash data can be	2. Issues with the data quality
	used to measure	3. Direct measurement
	safety and the issues	4. Surrogate measurement
	related to crash	
	counts	

Table 4Fundamental statistics

Subtopic	Objectives	Content
Fundamental Statistics	Refresh fundamental statistics related to safety analysis	 Mean and variance estimation Accuracy and standard error Related probability distribution faction Introduction to Empirical Bayes method

Subtopic	Objectives	Content
Introduction	Understand the purpose, development history and issues in safety models	 The need for safety predictive models in project decision making process Introduction to parametric and non- parametric modeling techniques Conceptual safety predictive model
Development of Safety Models	Understand the basic steps in safety modeling process and be able to develop models with local crash data	 Data cleaning process Exploratory data analysis Formulating model structure Parameter estimation Model fitness evaluation

Table 5Development of safety models

Table 6Safety predictive models from HSM

Subtopic	Objectives	Content
Safety Predictive Models from	Be familiar with the	1. Introduction to HSM
HSM	safety models for	models
	three types of	2. Rural 2-lane models
	highways for	3. Rural Multilane
	potential safety	models
	management	4. Urban and suburban
	applications.	arterials models

Subtopic	Objectives	Content
Introduction to safety evaluation	Understand the	Safety evaluation
	purpose and	objectives and
	requirements for	definitions
	safety evaluation	
Methodology	Understand the	1. The logical basis for
	correct way to do	safety evaluation
	safety evaluation and	2. General evaluation
	apply the	types
	fundamental concept	3. Observational nature
	in roadway safety to	of roadway safety
	estimate safety of a	evaluation
	project or crash	4. Before-and-after
	countermeasure	study
		5. Cross-sectional
		study
Case studies	Be able to perform	1. Atchafalaya I-10
	safety evaluation	Speed study
	analysis	2. Lane conversion (4U
		to 5T) study

Table 7Safety evaluations

All seven lecture notes are listed in Appendix A. All homework, quizzes, and exams are listed in Appendix B.

Comprehensive Safety Course Syllabus

Additionally, a comprehensive safety course syllabus was developed by this project. The course is a college level class on roadway safety from mainly a roadway engineering perspective. The targeted audiences for this course are undergraduate and graduate students majoring in engineering, specifically civil engineering. The course is designed to provide basic elements of roadway safety, emphasizing the roadway engineering side of the comprehensive 4E approach. The course materials can also be used for engineering continuing education on the topic of roadway safety and in roadway safety training workshops for a broad audience who are involved in highway safety from not just

engineering, but also education and enforcement.

The main goal of this course is to provide a fundamental understanding of roadway safety. Specifically, the course is designed to give students:

- Deeper understandings of interactions between driver, vehicle, and roadway
- Full awareness of safety implementations associated with roadway design, traffic control and policy decisions.
- Analyzing skills of crash statistics

The syllabus is listed in Appendix C.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The results of this project are a complete teaching package for highway safety fundamentals. This teaching package consists of seven lecture notes and course evaluation materials (homework and exams). This teaching package can be utilized in whole or in part by transportation engineering courses in a university setting or professional training workshops. The PI will be available to provide a training course, if needed.

CONCLUSIONS

It is critical to teach fundamental highway safety in college to undergraduate and graduate students in order to sustain the safety improvement of the last few years.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended a training-the-trainers' effort be initiated as a follow up of this project.

ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS


AASHTO	American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
FHWA	Federal Highway Administration
HSM	Highway Safety Manual

REFERENCES

- Website: http://rspcb.safety.fhwa.dot.gov/training.aspx Last Accessed: September 24, 2013.
- 2. Website: <u>http://www.rsa.unc.edu/101.cfm</u> Last Accessed: September 24, 2013.
- Website: <u>http://www.highwaysafetymanual.org/Pages/Training.aspx</u> Last Accessed: September 24, 2013.
- 4. Hauer, E., Observational Before-After Studies in Road Safety, Emerald Group Publishing Limited (February 1, 1997).
- 5. Elvik, R., Handbook of Road Safety Measures, Emerald Group Publishing Limited; 2nd Revised edition (October 20, 2009).
- 6. Haque, M. O., Road Safety: Data Collection, Analysis, Monitoring and Countermeasure Evaluations with Cases, University Press of America (December 20, 2008).
- 7. AASHTO, Highway Safety Manual. 1st Ed., American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, DC, 2010.
- 8. Evans, L., Traffic Safety, Science Serving Society (August 2004).
- 9. Ogden, K., Safer Roads: A Guide to Road Safety Engineering, Ashgate Publishing, Limited, Hampshire, England, 1996.
- 10. Cameron, A.C., and Trivedi, P.K., Regression Analysis of Count Data, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1998.
- 11. Washington, S.P., Karlaftis, M.G., and Mannering, F.L., Statistical and Econometric Methods for Transportation Data Analysis, Chapman Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, FL, 2003.
- 12. Shinar, D., Traffic Safety and Human Behavior, Elsevier Ltd, Oxford, U.K., 2007.
- 13. Spiegelman, C., Park, E.S., and Rilett, L.R., Transportation Statistics and Microsimulation, Chapman and Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, FL, 2010.
- 14. Bill, A., Beyerlein, S., Heaslip, K., Hurwitz, D. S., Kyte, M., Sanford Bernhardt, K. L, and Young, R. K., Development of Knowledge Tables and Learning Outcomes for the Introductory Course in Transportation Engineering. Transportation Research Board 90th Annual Meeting CD, 2011, Washington, DC.
- Model Curriculum for Highway Safety Core Competencies, NCHRP Report 667, National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC, 2010.
- Bahar, G., Highway Safety Training Synthesis/Roadmap, NCHRP Project 20-07, Task 290, National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board, March 2011.
- 17. ITE, The Traffic Safety Toolbox: a primer on traffic safety, Institute of Transportation Engineers, Washington, DC, 1999.


- Persaud, B.N., Statistical Methods in Highway Safety Analysis, NCHRP Synthesis of Highway Practice 295, Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC, 2001.
- Lord, D., and Mannering, F., The Statistical Analysis of Crash-Frequency Data: A Review and Assessment of Methodological Alternatives, Transportation Research - Part A, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp. 291-305, 2010.
- 20. Hauer, E., and Heckert, A.S., Extent and Some Implications of Incomplete Accident Reporting, Transportation Research Record 1185, pp. 1-8, 1987.
- 21. Divall, D., Road Safety Education Best Practice, Project No. PPR456, Department of Environment, Northern Ireland, 2011.
- Svensson, M., and Johansson, M.V., Willingness to pay for private and public road safety in stated preference studies: Why the difference? Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 1205-1212, 2010.
- 23. Davis, G., Possible Aggregation Biases in Road Safety Research and a Mechanism Approach to Accident Modeling, Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 36, No. 6, pp. 1119-1127, 2004.
- 24. Mahera, M. and Mountainb, L., The sensitivity of estimates of regression to the mean, Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 861-868, 2009.
- Persaud, B.N., and Lyon, C., Empirical Bayes Before-and-After Safety Studies: Lessons Learned from Two Decades of Experience. Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 546-555, 2007.
- 26. Gross, F., Persaud, B., and Lyon, C., A Guide to Developing Quality Crash Modification Factors. FHWA-SA-10-032. FHWA, Washington, DC, 2010.

APPENDIX A: TEACHING PACKAGE



This introduction lecture aims to let students:

- 1. Be familiar with the gravity of the problem
- 2. Recognize the multidimensional aspects of safety
- 3. Identify influential and contributing factors to a crash and its severity






Travel by highway is one of the most hazardous activities that people undertake particularly in developing countries.

Ref 1: http://www.trauma.org/archive/history/epidemiology.html


Ref 2:

http://www.firstaidinaction.net/content/download/2633/24897/version/1/file

Ref 3: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs358/en/



Emphasizing the side-effect of motorization in last century.



Crash problems in developing countries and in the whole world.

For example, the rate of child deaths due to road crashes in South Africa is 26 per 100,000 population, compared with 1.7 per 100,000 in Europe.

Ref 1: http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/youth roadsafety/en/

Ref 2:

http://www.who.int/violence injury prevention/road safety status/report/state of ro ad safety_en.pdf

Ref 3: http://www.roadsafetyfund.org/Pages/default.aspx




Put it in perspective

Ref 1: http://www.medicalteams.org/Stories/worldwide-events


A grim problem in the U.S.							
	1999	2009					
Fatal Crashes Fatalities per 10 million VMT	37,140 1.55	30,797 1.09					
Population	272,690,813	307,007,000					
Register Vehicles	212,685,000	257,794,000					
		UNIVERSITY LOUISIANA					

Let's look at the U.S. statistics. Ref 1: <u>http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS</u>



Yes, improvements have been made, evidenced by the numbers; however, 2012 experienced an increase but not reaching the previous level. Why?

Ref 1: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/us/01driving.html?_r=0



People sometimes have a hard time perceiving a situation by numbers, let's compare the statistics.


Lots of effort has been made in curbing criminal activities in the U.S. in the last three decades.

Ask question: "How many people will die in crashes during this 150 minute session?"

Ref 1: self calculated

Ref 2: http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10223&page=72

Ref 3: http://ethanfoundation.org/home.html



Again, put it in perspective.


Highway safety does not receive the attention it deserves because fatality happens individually, unlike airline crashes.

Ref 1:


http://www.saferoads.org/press/press2003/pr JackeStateme nt5-21-03.htm

Ref 2:

http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10223&page= 71



This slide, based on a chart in Newsweek magazine, notes things that are, in Newsweek's words, "unsettling threats" and their far "riskier counterparts". Note that fatal airline crashes are an "unsettling threat" but not likely, while fatal car crashes is the "riskier counterpart" to airline crashes. The same thing is true of murders versus the far riskier threat of suicide. And the enormous difference between the threat of peanut allergy death versus the far more likely chance of dying of unintentional poisoning.




A crash fatality does not equal to airline fatality.

Ref 1: <u>http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1346042/Number-passengers-killed-airline-crashes-soars-2010--safer-travelling-roads.html</u>

	e Airplane Fatalities o Traffic Fatalities	close to
WORLD TOLLS	AIRLINE DEATH	
YEAR 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010	DEATHS 778 1,022 702 466 1,050 863 744 583 749 817	
		UNIVERSITY LOUISIANA

Ref 1: <u>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_crashs_and_incidents</u> Airline crashes are so dramatized- but look at these numbers!




What happened each year in your state?

Here are some crash statistics of Louisiana:

- 3% (80/110) of pedestrians killed were male
- 110 pedestrians killed (8 were children aged 14 or under)

Ref : <u>http://datareports.lsu.edu/CrashReportIndex.aspx</u> Do you know the numbers in your state?




How are we doing compared to other states? Not well at all. Because of the difference in population (more precisely, in number of licensed drivers) we compare rate, not absolute numbers.

The bottom five states are: Montana, Louisiana, South Carolina, West Virginia, and Arkansas. Top five in lower fatality rate: Massachusetts, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey and District of Columbia.


Ref 1:

http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/transportation/motor vehicle crashs and fatalities.html



In 1990, road traffic crashes ranked 9^{th} on the ten leading causes of death and disability in the world.

According to the World Heath Organization (WHO), by 2020, it is estimated that road traffic crashs will be the 3^{rd} leading cause of death and disability.



With the advances made in medicine, lots of diseases are curable or will become curable. But....


Ref 1:

http://grsp.drupalgardens.com/sites/grsp.drupalgardens.com/files/WHO%20t ables.pdf


eadi	ng causes of dea	aths by age gr	oup, world, 20	02			
tank	0-4 years	5–14 years	15–29 years	30-44 years	45–59 years	≥60 years	All ages
1	Lower respiratory infections 1 890 008	diseases 219 434	HIV/AIDS 707 277	HIV/AIDS 1 178 856	lschaemic heart disease 1 043 978	Ischaemic heart disease 5 812 863	lschaemic heart disease 7 153 056
2	Diarrhoeal diseases 1 577 891	Road traffic lojunes 130 835	ROad trattic injuries 302 208	390 004	Cerebrovascular disease 62.3.099	Cerebrovascular disease 4 685 722	Cerebrovascular disease 5 489 591
3	Low birth weight 1 149 168	Lower respiratory infections 127.78	Self-inflicted	Read traffic injuries	Tuberculosis 400 704	Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases 2 396 739	Lower respiratory infections 3 764 415
4	Malaria 1 098 446				NJURIE	Swer respiratory Infections 1 395 611	HIV/AID5 2 818 762
5	Childhood duster diseases 1 046 177	Browning B6 327	Violence	Self-Inflicted injuries 23,490	Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases	Trachea, bronchus, lung cancers 927 889	Chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases 2 743 509
6	Birth asphyxia and birth trauma 729 066	ма Ка п	infections 92 522	Violence	lung cancers 261 860	Diabetes mellitus 749 977	Diarrhoeal diseases 1 766 447
7	HIV/AIDS 370 706	Tropical cluster dise Ran	k 2:45 16		Cirrhosis of the liver	Hypertensive heart disease 732 262	Childhood-cluster diseases 1 359 548
8	Congenital heart anomalies 223 569	Fires 611 33 046	87 499	Cirrhostrol the IN the 100 101	221 776	Stomach cancer 605 395	Tuberculosis 1 605 063
9	Protein–energy malnutrition 138 197		k 3: 30	- 44 ve	ar olds	Tuberculosis 495 199	Trachea, bronchus, lung cancers 1 238 417
10	STDs excluding HIV 67 871	Protein—energy malnutrition 30 763	Hypertensive disorders 61 711	Poisonings B1 930	Stomach cancer 185 188	Colon and rectum cancers 476 902	Malaria 1 221 432
11	Meningitis 64 255	™Ran	k 8: 45	5 – 59 ye	ear olds	Nephritis and nephrosis 440 708	Road traffic injuries 1 183 492
12	Drowning 57 287	Leukaemia 21 097	lschaemic heart disease 53.870	Maternal haemorrhage 63 191	Diabetes mellitus 175 423	Alzheimer and other dementias 382 339	Low birth weight
13	Road traffic injuries 49.736	₂ ^₅ Ran	k 13: () – 4 yea	ar olds	Liver cancer 367 503	Diabetes mellitus 982 175
14 (Endocrine disorders 42 619	Violence 18 551	Childhood cluster diseases 48 101	Drowning 56 744	Breast cancer 147 489	Cirrhosis of the liver 366 417	Hypertensive heart disease 903 612
15	Tuberculosis 40 574	Poisonings 18 529	Abortion 43782	Liver cancer 55 486	Hypertensive heart disease 129 634	Oesophagus cancer 318 112	Self-inflicted injuries 874 955

The table provides a global view of road casualties compared to other illnesses by age group. Public health experts are very concerned about the crash risk posed throughout the world. It is rapidly growing, especially in developing nations.

The Table shows in general, the driving risk for young people is extremely high, but older people experience less risk. This table depicts the public health view of road safety. Keep in mind, this is a global view. A similar map for the U.S. might look different. Can you see places where you think this might be the case? (Hint: the U.S. population is aging rapidly and the proportion of older people in the total population is rising. Crash risk for people over 75-80 is higher than any other age group except novice drivers.)




No discrimination towards age groups here (we will all get old sooner or later) just some facts.



Highway safety- a noble cause!


The main goal for highway safety is to extend the lives of people, most of whom should have many more years on this earth. What we do and what we accomplish is **more** important in this sense than the work of most doctors. Improving highway safety is mostly to save young people.




Crash problem also hurts us economically.


Every 1 percent reduction will prevent 430 deaths and \$2.3 billion annually in medical expenses and other losses from these collisions. Moreover, collisions are a leading cause of nonrecurring congestion. Collision prevention has added benefits in terms of reduced delay, fuel consumption, and emissions.

Ref : <u>http://www.fiafoundation.org/Documents/Road%20Safety/counting the cost</u> <u>report.pdf</u>






The crash problem also hurts governments at all levels directly and indirectly.




When is the last time you saw the commercials made by injury attorneys?




Huge compensations are demanded.




What is the cost in your state?



By Evans, Leonard book "Traffic Safety" published August 2004.



It is worthwhile to know that U.S. has lost its number one status in roadway safety.




How do other leading countries do in reducing roadway safety? Ref : http://www.ltrc.lsu.edu/tec_07/presentations/highway.pdf




What do we do in these areas?

Ref 1: <u>http://www.wbtw.com/story/22810618/survey-finds-seat-belt-use-up-in-south-carolina</u>





Australia


- Vehicle design standards 1970 (i.e., mandatory fitting of seatbelts) Seatbelts 1973
- Motorcycle helmets 1973
- Random breath testing 1976-1988 all Australian states introduced mandatory random breath testing
- Bicycle helmets 1990-1992
- · Safer roads through the Federal "Blackspot program"
- Introduction of improved enforcement technologies (speed cameras, red light cameras and radar "guns")




Effective policy (or regulation) makes a difference.









All Australian states introduced mandatory random breath testing in 1976-1988.




- Safer roads through the Federal "Blackspot program"
- Introduction of improved enforcement technologies (speed cameras, red light cameras and radar "guns")




Bicycle helmets were enforced in 1990-1992.




- Safer roads through the Federal "Blackspot program"
- Introduction of improved enforcement technologies (speed cameras, red light cameras and radar "guns")






Although the U.S. is not number one on the world on roadway safety, great progress has been made in the last 50 years. It is just not enough!


Ref 1: http://www.nhtsa.gov/FARS




The leadership has fully recognized the problem.




It is one thing to set up goals; it is another to have tangible means to achieve the goals.



Before discussing the concrete actions to reduce crashes, let's talk about the complexity of roadway safety.




It is common to blame someone or something for a crash.



Crashes occur when bodies (entire vehicle, occupants, baggage, etc.) in motion collide. Three stages occur in most crashes. First, the vehicle hits something; second, the occupants hit the inside of the vehicle; and finally, internal organs slam against the skeletal structure.

The forces and energy involved in crashes can become quite extreme. Analyzing the forces in a motor vehicle crash is a complex undertaking. When a car is traveling along a road it has a certain amount of energy, called kinetic (motion) energy. In normal driving, kinetic energy is converted to heat through braking (brake pads to rotors and rubber to pavement). In fact, normal driving is a repetitive exercise of converting kinetic energy to heat. In a motor vehicle crash, kinetic energy is converted to heat (tires, metal, etc.), friction losses (tires, scraping, etc.), and crush energy (deformation of car and human parts).




The scope of this workshop will not cover the equations involved in calculating crash energy but consider one example. If a 3000-lb. car is traveling at 60 mph (88 ft/sec) and collides with a solid wall, what is the crush depth of the vehicle (assume wall does not crush at all)? The answer is the car must be crushed 4.9 ft. to convert all of the kinetic energy to crush energy. Hopefully, the car is designed to sustain 4.9 ft. of crush damage without harming the occupants.




Suppose that the driver was able to reduce speed by 20 mph by applying the brakes prior to impact (converting some of the kinetic energy to heat energy), what would the crash depth in this scenario? The crash damage is substantially less as a result of applying the brakes. This outcome may represent the difference between being killed and walking away from the crash unharmed. Some important concepts related to crash dynamics are:

- Kinetic energy of motion is converted to heat, friction, and crush damage.
- Converting kinetic energy to heat through braking represents normal driving.
- Crash "survivability" is related to how energy is absorbed by the vehicle and passengers.

• In general the smaller the energy and the greater the time permitted to absorb the energy, the more survivable the crash.





Let's "dissect" a crash

Dr. William Haddon was an epidemiologist, who is credited with first describing the highway safety challenge in terms of how the medical profession would approach a disease –


- how to prevent it from happening
- how to treat it while it's happening; to reduce severity
- how to recover after the event.

AND..., you should look at key elements affecting the problem; in this case, what are the relationships among the person, the vehicle, and the environment (esp. including roadway features).


He became the first Director of the organization which would become NHTSA.

The USDOT works in <u>ALL</u> areas of this matrix.

Ref 1: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1228774/




For example, an crash occurred under the following circumstances: Driver A was approaching a traffic signal and stopped abruptly when the light changed to yellow. Driver B, who was in the following vehicle, did not manage to stop in time. A rearend collision occurred and Driver A received a whiplash injury. Many possible causes can be ascribed to this simple story. A police officer might record "following too close" as the cause but this is a restatement of what occurred and does not lead to interventions.



Driver B's failure to stop in time is also related to the abruptness of the action by Driver A. The human causes explaining the unexpected or hard braking of Driver A may be: bad judgment, impaired cognitive skills, deficient driving habits, distraction, or a truck preventing a clear view of the signal.

Ref : http://www.ite.org/Membersonly/techconference/2008/CB08C2002.pdf





The auto headrest was invented and designed by a man in Arcadia, California, G. J. Schifano, in the mid 1950s, when his doctor was telling him about the alarmingly increased numbers of whiplash patients he was seeing. Headrests started to appear as an option on American cars in the late 1960s. Headrests were required by <u>NHTSA</u> in all cars sold in the US, effective January 1, 1969.

Today, most headrests are cushioned for comfort, are height adjustable and most commonly finished in the same material as the rest of the seat, as seen in the picture to the right.

Headrests are provided for comfort and safety. They are designed to prevent the backlash movement of the occupant's head should a collision occur. This, in turn, can prevent potentially fatal <u>whiplash</u> neck injuries.

When travelling in an <u>automobile</u>, a properly adjusted headrest can reduce the severity of the <u>neck</u> <u>injury</u>. The top of the headrest should be in line with the top of the occupant's head.






A different traffic control at this intersection such as a stop sign or roundabout could have changed the outcome.

If an alternative access-controlled road was available elsewhere, the drivers might not have used this at-grade intersection.


In terms of policy and planning causes, more investment in public transportation might have moved these drivers out of their cars.



Learning about crash causes assists in the planning, design, and maintenance of infrastructure, and in the management of the overall highway system, both of which include the selection of treatments for crash prevention and the reduction of crash consequences.

Dissecting a Crash			
	Human	Vehicle	Roadway and other factors
Pre-crash will the crash occur?	1a	1b	1c
Crash How severe will it be	2a	2b	2c
Post-crash What will be the outcome?	3a	3b	3c

For example, the rear-end crash described previously illustrates the use and usefulness of the Haddon Matrix in the following slides.



Ref : http://www.ite.org/Membersonly/techconference/2008/CB08C2002.pdf


<u>Cell 1c</u>: Physical environment factors such as wet pavement, polished aggregate, steep downgrade, badly coordinated signal system, etc. Social environment factors such as cultural norms, laws, regulations and enforcement that determine alcohol use, use of cell phones while driving, consideration of safety in signal timing and coordination, etc.


The event factors influencing the severity of damage and injury once an crash has occurred may include:

<u>Cell 2a</u>: human factors such as vulnerability to injury, e.g., age, failure to wear a seat belt, etc.

<u>Cell 2b:</u> vehicle factors such as bumper heights and energy adsorption, headrest design, airbag operations, etc.

LOUISIANA






This example shows how the Haddon Matrix assists in creating order when thinking about crash causes. The Haddon Matrix also allows for the orderly consideration of which treatments may apply to which factor or cause and crash phase. The effect of treatments or interventions is discussed in the next section.

Cell 3c: social environment factors such as funding and policy decisions, prevailing medical insurance system, inclination to complain of injury, litigiousness, etc.


Now, let's do an exercise on a "T-Bone" collision at intersection.



Not all distracted drivers, unforgiving roadside designs, vehicle mechanical problems result in crashes. A severe crash occurs when all risky situations come together. To prevent crashes, we need to build strong defense system (layers)



• Need to understand characteristics of all components of the system and interactions between the components




Understanding motor vehicle crashes and contributing crash factors requires a multidisciplinary perspective. Applying a broad perspective to motor vehicle crashes is difficult due to the compartmentalization that naturally occurs. Departments of transportation (local, state, federal) are responsible for roadway countermeasures, while behavioral countermeasures are often considered by health agencies, the medical and insurance communities, state highway safety offices, motor carrier safety representatives, and advocacy groups. So although a multi-disciplinary approach is desired, it is often difficult to achieve. The graphic on this slide shows the interaction effect. For example, 24 percent of crashes involve factors associated with both the roadway and road user behavior.


The figure presents some findings from a study that compares causes of crashes in the United States and Great Britain. This study notes that only 3 percent of crashes are due solely to the roadway environment, 57 percent solely to drivers, 2 percent solely to vehicles, 27 percent to the interaction between road environment and drivers, and 3 percent to the interaction of the environment-driver vehicle. Taken at face value, this suggest that road-related elements are associated with 34 percent of crash causation (or 40% by another account). Consequently, a perfect model would attribute about 34 percent of R² to the roadway road variables, including the driver and the vehicle. Recent work in this area looks at an alternative methods of evaluating the effects of the driver and the traffic. One obvious question is: Why not go directly to phase 3? There are three reasons. While there are traffic models that could (and will be) adapted to IHSDM, there is no appropriate driver module. The analysis and simulation techniques have not been developed. Finally, the crash relations from phase 2 may be needed.




It is time to introduce this complex system.




First, let's start discussion on users– the component with souls and personalities.




Users are highly diversified in several aspects.




Age



Crash rate by age reveals better information.




Which group has the most significant improvement? What does that mean?



Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for 15-to-20 year-olds (based on 2004 figures, which are the latest mortality data available). In 2006, 3,490 15-to20-year-old drivers were killed and an additional 272,000 were injured in motor vehicle crashes; 12.9 percent of all the drivers involved in fatal crashes were between 15 and 20 years old and 16 percent of all drivers involved in police-reported crashes were young drivers; while they represented only 8.5 percent of the population.


Younger drivers are more likely to be involved in alcohol-related crashes and avoid wearing safety belts than the general population. In 2006, 25 percent of the young drivers who were killed in crashes had a BAC of 0.08 or higher. For young drivers, alcohol involvement is higher among males than among females. Twenty seven percent of the young male drivers involved in fatal crashes had been drinking at the time of the crash, compared to 15 percent of the young female drivers involved in fatal crashes.




Age-related decreases in vision, cognitive functions, and physical impairments may affect some older adults' driving ability. In 2006, 12 percent of the total U.S. resident population (37 million) was people age 65 and older; yet, they made up 14 percent of all traffic fatalities, 14 percent of vehicle occupant fatalities, and 19 percent of all pedestrian fatalities.

Older drivers do not have quick perception and reaction times compared to their younger counterparts, but they drive less on average than other age groups and avoid driving under perceived dangerous circumstances (e.g., at night, in unfamiliar environments, on high speed roadways, etc.); thus are involved in fewer crashes on a per licensed driver basis. Older drivers tend to drive slower and less aggressively. They are also more likely than the general population to wear safety belts and less likely to drive impaired.

However, older persons are generally the most physically vulnerable to injury in motor vehicle crashes. In general, visual and cognitive performances on driving-related tasks diminish with age. Compared with crashes of younger drivers, older drivers are overrepresented in crashes that involve multi-vehicle collisions and underrepresented in single-vehicle crashes. Older drivers are also more likely to be the responsible party in their collisions.




· Potential aging problem in roadway safety



This graphic shows the "squaring" of the population pyramid in the U.S. Where the older population once made up a small percentage of the population, the pyramid is turning into a square. It also shows by 2050, women will be a far more significant proportion of the population compared to previous generations. This presents additional issues in terms of not only safety but also mobility as older women are far more likely to be living alone and in poverty than comparable men. In addition, older women are more likely to self-regulate and take themselves out of the driving environment for reasons which are not entirely clear. More research is needed to explore this issue.

Ref 1: http://www.censusscope.org/us/chart_age.html




• No gender discrimination, just gender difference in roadway safety!




Ask the participants if they think racial disparity exists on any of the factors listed. According to a technical report published by the National Center for Statistics and Analysis, racial and ethnic minorities are disproportionately killed in traffic crashes, compared with the much larger non-Hispanic White population. The percentage of fatally injured drivers who were drinking was highest for Native Americans (57%) and Hispanics or Latinos (47%).

Fatally injured Native American and Hispanic drivers were less likely to hold valid licenses than White, Asian and Pacific Islander or African American drivers. Native Americans were also more likely to have had prior driving while intoxicated (DWI) convictions and license suspensions. African Americans were the most likely to have had speeding convictions and convictions for other moving violations.




Like gender and age, cultural backgrounds may influence the likelihood of an individual being injured or killed in a crash. Examining how culture influences road safety is essential not only for understanding the causes of safety problems, but also for designing culturally sensitive solutions.




Now let's briefly look at users' physical and mental capacity and limitations. Since 95% information are visual while on roadway, let's first human visual capabilities.

1. One of the visual capabilities which is diminished in older drivers is visual acuity.

- 2. Definition of VISUAL ACUITY is:
 - The ability to pick out fine detail and high contrast features. It is necessary for reading information on road signs.
- 3. What is the first test in obtaining a driver's license? (a vision test)
- 4. Can you obtain a driver's license if you are deaf?
- 5. Can you obtain a driver's license if you are blind?
- 6. Experts tell us that more than 80% of the information in the driving task is visual information; being able to see and see *well* is crucial to the driving task.
- 7. Visual acuity of 20/40 with or without corrective lenses for both eyes or one blind eye is the predominant minimum standard for driver licensing for passenger car drivers. However, there are an increasing number of states (including Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Illinois, and others) that will grant low-vision drivers with acuities as poor as 20/70 to 20/100 a restricted license.




An example on contrast sensitivity




Another sad example--we will all get old sooner or later.

• Diminished Visual Capabilities & Consequences for Driving Performance




Few examples: something we can do collectively to make roadway travel environment safer for people at all ages.



Brief mental capability discussion:

- ability to filter information and continuously focus on the most critical information
- ability to process information from multiple sources simultaneously
- time to make a decision and then physically respond with a controlled vehicle movement
- ability to store, manipulate, and retrieve information for later use




This slide represents the area that we are able to take in at a glance and process appropriately. Our "attention window" or "useful field of view" is not merely what we can see, but what we are able to process visually. The following three pictures may help show you what happens to your attention window as a result of distraction or age-related slowing of information processing.

In this first picture, you see a large attention window (white, unshaved area), which is common among individuals with no visual information processing restrictions. When people have a normal sized attention window, they can make timely responses even to unexpected events occurring away from the forward focus of attention.

In this next picture, the smaller white area shows an attention window that has shrunk; when this happens, people can't process information as efficiently and are extremely sensitive to distractions. People with a smaller attention window are often surprised by turning cars, pedestrians, etc. In this next picture, the smaller white area shows an attention window that has shrunk; when this happens, people can't process information as efficiently and are extremely sensitive to distractions. People with a smaller attention window are often surprised by turning cars, pedestrians, etc.



Again, few examples on what we can do collectively to make roadway travel environment safer for people at all ages.



- Aging (as well as disease and disuse) brings about changes in the components and structure of the bones, ligaments, joints, and muscles. These changes may impair a driver's ability to control their vehicle in a timely fashion.
 - 14% of men and 17% of women over age 65 experience reduced arm and shoulder flexibility (upper limb impairment). Strength & range of motion in the arms are related to the ability to turn the steering wheel to negotiate turns at intersections.
- Research has shown that: (1) Women age 65+ who have difficulty in extending their arms above their shoulders are at a 2-fold elevated crash risk compared to those without this difficulty; and (2) Older persons with bursitis that caused pain and limitation of shoulder mobility had a crash rate of twice that for people without bursitis of the shoulder. About 30% of men and 43% of women over age 65 experience reduced leg, knee, ankle, and foot flexibility (lower limb impairment). Strength and range of motion of the legs determine the ability to move the foot from the accelerator to the brake.
- Perhaps most common is the age-related decline in head and neck mobility. Joint flexibility has been estimated to decline by approximately 25 percent in older adults, due to arthritis, calcification of cartilage, and joint deterioration. This restricted range of motion reduces an older driver's ability to effectively scan to the rear and sides of his/her vehicle to observe blind spots, and can also hinder the timely recognition of conflicts during turning and merging maneuvers at intersections.
- Drivers with a limited range of motion in their neck were 6 times more likely to have been in a crash, cited for a moving violation, or stopped by police in the year after health assessment compared to older drivers without impairments in neck flexibility. Difficulties in scanning could result in unsafe maneuvering when there is a need to:

Look over your shoulder before changing lanes.

ramp.

Look behind you as you approach the mainline of a freeway from an entrance

Look behind you before entering a through lane from an acceleration lane, after making a right turn at an intersection.

Look for cross traffic at a skewed intersection before proceeding.



More examples

• Eliminate skewed junctions (strive for 90 degrees, but no less than 75 degrees).

• Maintain minimum 3.7 m (12 ft.) lane width, particularly for receiving lanes at intersections and on arterials with horizontal curvature.


• Increase perception-reaction time (PRT) value from 2.0 seconds to 2.5 seconds for calculation of intersection sight distance (ISD) for ISD Cases I-V, where unrestricted sight distance is not feasible.

• Design intersection corner curb radii at a minimum of 7.5 to 9 m (30 ft.).

• Use parallel rather than tapered entrance ramp design for freeway merging operations.

• Design longer acceleration lanes and merging/weaving areas.

• Base pedestrian control signal timing on an assumed walking speed of 0.85 meters/second (2.8 feet/second), rather than the 1.2 meters/second (4 feet/second) value, as recommended in the MUTCD.



Human factors and biomechanics professionals study the capabilities and limitations of the human body, often in relation to the design of various devices and systems. Within the transportation field, the human factors and biomechanical elements are critical to the safe design of the vehicle as well as the safe design and operations of the roadway. Biomechanics help explain the physical durability and limitations of the human body.




Now comes the most critical user element: (Chinese slogan) "You can change mountains and rivers but not a person's nature."


But we must!



Such crashes are happening everyday!




Manifestations of aggressive driving include driving too fast for conditions (unsafe speeding), following too close for conditions, passing in unsafe conditions, etc. A common thread in aggressive driving is the choice to drive too aggressively considering the prevailing conditions. According to NHTSA, speeding was a contributing factor in 31% of all 2006 fatal crashes, resulting in 13,543 lives lost. The number of fatal crashes involving speeding is shown in the table. Speeding is a difficult concept to nail down because definitions vary widely. However, when you think about it, if drivers are paying attention and not speeding, they are highly unlikely to be involved in a crash because they will recognize a hazard and correct for it in most cases. In at least one state, the law enforcement training academies (with the exception of the State Police Academy) discourage new recruits from citing speeding as a factor in crash investigations because it is difficult to prove in court.




The propensity of an individual to take risks on the roadway is associated with demographic factors such as age and gender. Young drivers, and young men in particular, are much more likely to be involved in fatal crashes not only because of lack of experience, but also because of increased willingness to engage in risky behaviors such as drinking and driving, not wearing a safety belt, and speeding. For example, in 2004, the motor vehicle death rate for male drivers and passengers aged 16 to 19 was more than one and a half times that of their female counterparts (19.4 per 100,000 compared with 11.1 per 100,000). Recently, young women drivers have shown increases in crash involvement, but this phenomenon is not well understood and may be related to greater exposure.

This chart shows the percentage of drivers who were speeding in fatal crashes by age and gender in 2006. It is clear from the chart that the younger a driver is, the more likely they are to be speeding when involved in a fatal crash. It is also clear that men have much higher rates of speeding than women. Older drivers, by contrast, do not engage as much in risky behaviors such as speeding and drinking and driving. In 2006, for example, drivers aged 65 and older had the lowest rates of intoxication among fatally injured drivers. However, it is wise to keep in mind that definitions of "speeding" differ among and within states, so it is important to know exactly what we are examining. Various definitions exist, such as, exceeding the posted speed limit, speeding too fast for conditions, etc.


As a result of in engaging these risky behaviors, a disproportionate number of young drivers die in car crashes. In fact, the risk of motor vehicle crashes is higher among 16- to 19-year-olds than any other age group. Per mile driven, teen drivers ages 16 to 19 are four times more likely than older drivers to crash.



Driving while intoxicated, under the influence of drugs (illegal, over the counter, or prescription), or fatigued all are known to contribute to crashes. According to NHTSA(1), there were 17,602 alcohol-related fatalities in 2006, 41% of all traffic fatalities that year. These data too may be underreported. For example, it is far less likely that a 65 year old women who experiences an intersection related fatal crash will be tested for impairment than a 21 year old male who crashes at 2:00 AM. It would be ideal if all states tested all persons involved in fatal crashes; however, as noted throughout the course, law enforcement officers have their hands full at the scene of a crash and often contributing crash factors are overlooked.




A sad fact!




Driving with a revoked license, without a license, and without insurance tends to be associated with high-risk driving. NHTSA has developed statistics showing the relationship among of prior convictions, speeding convictions, recorded suspensions and drivers BAC levels in fatal crashes in 2006.

Over 84% of driver fatalities involve one of these three factors of the driver killed.
62%
48% 51%
"This is accepted as Louisiana's Culture – We need to change this culture!" from the 2009 LaDOTD Safety Summit

Can we change the culture and how?



Each of these can be done, which has been proved in other countries.



Now on another system component.

Vehicle design is a significant factor for road safety. The tradeoffs between large and small vehicles are complex and poorly understood due to very different relationships with crash risk, and because we typically only observe crashes after they happen (and not crashes that are avoided). In general, newer vehicles have better safety equipment and performance characteristics than older vehicles.


We can classify vehicle safety factors into two categories:

- Crash avoidance Factors that help to prevent a crash. Numerous factors are incorporated into
 vehicles that help prevent crashes. In general, the more maneuverable and agile a vehicle is the
 more likely it is that it can avoid a crash. Also light, compact, and low vehicles offer superior
 maneuverability compared to heavy, large, and tall vehicles. Major factors that contribute to good
 maneuverability are:
- Crash survivability: Once a crash occurs, a different set of vehicle factors become important. The survivability of a crash depends on many factors. The following factors do not affect how many crashes occur, but how severe they are.
- Safety equipment: airbags, safety belts and child car seats, crumple zones, energy absorbing designs, forgiving interiors, etc.
- Propensity for rollover. Vehicles that rollover typically result in greater injuries than those that do
 not. Rollover probability is related to center of mass as well as other vehicle dimensions and
 attributes.
- Energy absorption. The key to crash survivability is the ability of the vehicle to absorb energy over a long period of time (scale of milliseconds). All else being equal, more massive vehicles have more energy absorbing potential than less massive vehicles.


New Auto Technology Can Tell When You're 'Driving While Drowsy
 In the age of multilingual GPS devices, driver seat massages and cruise control navigation, it was only a matter of time before manufacturers developed drowsy driver alerts.
 Useful additions to driver safety is emerging in various forms and functions. Crash Avoidance: Driver Aids

An example on safe vehicle:

That's right – technology to tell you when you're in danger in nodding off behind the wheel, bringing you back to full attention through dashboard icons and warning alarms.



One person's lack of sleep can contribute to another's lack of safety on the Nation's roads. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Senior Research Psychologist Jesse Blatt, fatigue and sleep deprivation contribute to about 100,000 police-reported highway crashes, causing more than 1,500 deaths annually in the United States.



And then there are \$250 dashboard devices, like the Danish-made Anti-Sleep Pilot set for U.S. release in the coming months which uses sensors charting 26 different factors to detect tiredness. Drivers using that product also have to tap the sensor every 10 to 15 minutes, with reaction times measured.





- Seat Belts
- Anti-lock brakes
- Puncture-resistant tires
- Air bag
- Crumple zone (absorb kinetic energy)












Two crash tests to show the significant improvement on vehicle design.



To get to this day, there are many legal issues needing to be resolved. It will certainly solve many safety problems.




Back to today's reality, we know which type of vehicle is safer.

The most popular mode of transportation is the passenger vehicle (e.g., cars, SUVs, vans, and light trucks) when considering total miles traveled. As such, the design of transportation facilities has reflected the desired use of the automobile. However, the passenger car is also represented in the largest percentage of crashes. In 2005, more than 94 percent of the 11 million vehicles involved in motor vehicle crashes were passenger cars (NHTSA, 2006). But...

Vehicle Type	Crash Type	Total Number of Crashes	Rate (per 100 million vehicle- miles traveled)	Rate (per 100 million registere vehicles)
	Fatal	25,029	1.55	18.52
Passenger Cars	Injury	1,893,000	117	1,401
Cars	Property Damage	4,169,000	258	3,085
	Fatal	22,838	2.01	24.05
Light Trucks	Injury	1,209,000	107	1,273
HUCKS	Property Damage	2,919,000	257	3,074
	Fatal	4,932	2.21	58.15
Large Trucks	Injury	82,000	37	971
nucks	Property Damage	354,000	159	4,176
	Fatal	4,655	43.22	74.75
Motorcycles	Injury	80,000	746	1,291
	Property Damage	18,000	168	291

Passenger vehicles are involved in many more fatal and injury crashes than other types of vehicles. However, controlling for vehicle miles of travel and number of registered vehicles, passenger vehicles are the least likely to be involved in serious crashes. Does this mean that passenger vehicles are "safer" than other types of vehicles? Not necessarily. We have to consider who is driving; where they are driving; and break the data down much further to answer this question. For example, the fatal and injury rate for large trucks is higher than passenger vehicles; however, it is generally not the truck occupants who are injured or killed but rather the passenger vehicle occupants.



It is time to talk about roadway infrastructure designed by us-civil engineers!


In addition to human factors and vehicles, roadway factors also influence the likelihood and severity of crashes. In many cases, human and roadway factors interact to contribute to a crash, such as a distracted driver driving through standing water, an aggressive driver hitting an edge rut, etc.

The most important factor contributing to crashes on any road (interstate, intersection, ramp, etc.) is the amount of exposure to risk of the road for a given time period. Exposure is directly related to traffic volumes (vehicles per mile) on road segments and entering volumes at intersections. The number of vehicles a facility is exposed to will be a dominant factor in explaining the crash experience at the location.


Roadway factors are grouped predominately by the types of facilities comprising the transportation system, including (but not limited to) interstates, intersections, rural highways, local roads, pedestrian facilities, and bicycle facilities. Safety of these different facilities varies greatly because they are built to different standards and vastly different types of activities occur on them, and often simply knowing the type of facility will provide an important indicator of safety. For example, intersections are locations of a large amount of conflicting vehicle movements, whereas rural highways are often locations of high speeds and unforgiving roadside environments.

		Injury	Total	
	Fatal Accidents	Accidents	Accidents	
	Number per	Number per	Number per	
RURAL	MVM	MVM	MVM	
2 Lanes	0.07	0.94	2.39	
4 or more lanes,				
divided subtotal	0.063	0.77	2.09	
Freeway	0.025	0.27	0.79	
URBAN				
2 Lanes	0.045	1.51	4.94	
4 or more lanes, undivided	0.04	2.12	6.65	
4 or more lanes,				
divided	0.027	1.65	4.86	
Freeway	0.012	0.4	1.43	

Note that these numbers do not reflect the safety of pedestrian and cyclists. As these travel modes get popular in the future, more attention must be paid to the safety design of pedestrian and bicycle travel facilities, which has been ignored in many states/locations.




A little discussion on the safety of pedestrians and cyclists. Current urban and suburban street design are not sufficient for safety of pedestrian and cyclists in most states.



Last on environmental factors.

Environmental crash factors are usually related to weather. Environmental factors contribute to crashes typically through interactions with vehicle or driver related factors, but sometimes they are outright responsible for crash occurrences. The following are the most common environmental factors that contribute to crashes.

- Rain. Wet pavement has lower friction than dry pavement, so traction is reduced. Also, pooling of water can lead to hydroplaning and loss of vehicle control. In most wet conditions drivers can accommodate the reduced friction; however, often a crash occurs in wet conditions due to drivers not accommodating sufficiently for the reduced friction between tires and pavement. Finally, rain can reduce visibility.
- Snow, sleet, and ice. Snow and ice (via freezing rain) can be hazardous due to extreme loss of traction.
- Fog. Fog is responsible for a large number of crashes and can lead to massive pile-ups. Fog can reduce visibility for several feet, virtually rendering a driver blind.
- Wind. Windy conditions can also contribute to crashes, especially for large trucks and vehicles.
- Sun. The sun can contribute to crashes because of glare and reduced visibility during periods of high glare.



Now we know to improve safety, we must have the 4E approach.



Lots of improvements have been on this E.


Summary


- Roadway safety is a serous public health, economical, and liability problem to a society
- Building a "multilayer defense system" is critical to reduce annual 1.3 million fatalities and 60 million injuries caused by crashes in the world.

Recap this lecture by summarizing what has been introduced.



Safety education is critical to reach the hefty goal of ASHHTO.






The purpose of this lecture is to let students understand the scientific definition of safety and be familiar with the evolution of basic safety concept. The lecture lays out the foundation for the upcoming analysis methods.




Start the lecture by asking this seemingly simple question.




Perceptions of what is safe or not safe may not always match actual safety.


It is thought that "lower speeds are safer"; important to know in the urban environment; slower means more time to react, more importantly, more time to perceive events around and process accurately.



Professionals look at the problem from a holistic approach.




Introduce two important safety definitions.




Must stress the differences between the two.

It is possible that some road treatment or improvement will induce a false sense of security in road users and, as a result, the number of crashes or accident severity increase.




The point marked A indicates the safety of a pedestrian using an uncontrolled midblock crosswalk that is not marked by painted lines, and the pedestrians' feeling of security under such conditions. The point marked A' indicates the safety and security of the pedestrian after the uncontrolled midblock crosswalk edgelines have been painted. Point A' is higher on the vertical axis, indicating that pedestrians have an increased sense of security. However, the safety of this location has decreased with an increase in the frequency of crashes, indicating a false sense of security. Points B and B' indicate the safety and security values before and after a TV-based safety publicity campaign respectively. In this case, road user security decreases while safety may have increased very slightly or not at all. The effects illustrated by A to A' and B to B' are not clear-cut improvements. However, the change between points C and C' indicate a clear-cut improvement in safety as well as security (such as flattening a severe sideslope). The change between points D to D' illustrates a clear-cut deterioration in both safety and security (such as eliminating illumination). Real-life treatments may be of the A, B, C or D types, and their effects on both safety and security are important.




Discuss this seemingly confident pedestrian crossing situation.




Highway safety is certainly not about personal experience, feelings, or anecdotes.




Number of crashes per unit time and location is a measurement of safety as you may think.




Although crashes are what we want to account for safety at the top, we need to understand how it occurred and their relevance the blocks above. <u>Safety as a continuum of events (not total independent from other events/situations</u>




Crashes are random occurrences. The following examples demonstrate the randomness of recorded crash counts.



Crash counts are related to safety but their fluctuation presents a problem for safety measuring. Discuss these two charts, gradually pointing out the problems with crash counts.




Make sure students understand why crash count does not equal safety.



Important points:

Crash counts do not equal safety but crash count does reflect safety if it is carefully treated.



Guide students through the discussion on treatment of crash counts.

TABLE D1 LLUSTRATING T	THE REGRESSIO	ON TO THE MEA	AN PHENOMENO	ON		
No. of Intersections With Given No. of Accidents in 1974–76	Accidents/ Intersection in 1974-76	Accidents/ Year/ Intersection in 1974–76	Accidents/ Year in 1974–76 for Group (rounded)	Accidents in 1977 for Group	Accidents/ Intersection in 1977	% Change
256	0	0	0	64	0.25	Large increa
218	Ĩ.	0.33	72	120	0.55	67%
173	2	0.67	116	121	0.70	Small increa
121	3	1.00	121	126	1.04	Small increa
97	4	1.33	129	105	1.08	-19%
70	5	1.67	117	93	1.33	-20%
54	6	2.00	108	84	1.56	-22%
32	7	2.33	75	72	2.25	-3%
29	8	2.67	77	47	1.62	-39%

٦


Reference: "Observational Studies" by Ezra Hauer

Г

- Intersections with large crash rates during 74-76 experienced the rate decreasing
- Intersections with small rate during 74-76 experienced an increase in crash rate
- Average crash rate for all years remained constant of 1.1/year/intersection

No. of Intersections With Given No. of Accidents in 1974–76	Accidents/ Intersection in 1974–76	Accidents/ Year/ Intersection in 1974–76	Accidents/ Year in 1974–76 for Group (rounded)	Accidents in 1977 for Group	Accidents/ Intersection in 1977	% Change
256	0	0	0	64	0.25	Large increase
218	1	0.33	72	120	0.55	67%
173	2	0.67	116	121	0.70	Small increase
121	3	1.00	121	126	1.04	Small increase
97	4	1.33	129	105	1.08	-19%
70		1.67	117	93	1.33	-20%
54	6	2.00	108	84	1.56	-22%
32	7	2.33	75	72	2.25	-3%
29	8	2.67	77	47	1.62	-39%
				en endelsen i		1.03080-3503
rashes/yea eriod 74-76		crashes/y p in 1977		reduction	Actual	reduction
.08		72		36	12 (wh	ıy)

To demonstrate the magnitude of the problem, imagine that the 54 intersections with 6 crash in 3 years were treated at the end of 1976 and recorded, for example, a total of 72 crashes in 1977. A conventional before and after comparison would estimate the treatment effect as a reduction of 108-72=36 per year. However, the reduction due to RTM alone would have been 24 crashes per year




Now it is time to ask students the question.

Definition

Safety of a roadway facility (segment, intersection and etc..) is the number of crashes by kind and severity, <u>expected</u> to occur on it in a specified period of time. It will always be denoted by μ and its estimate by $\hat{\mu}$


Crash type	C	Crash Severity		
Clash type	PDO	Injury	Fatal	
Rear-end	3.10	1.70	0.20	
Angle	1.40	0.90	0.10	
Single-vehicle	e 0.30	0.10	0.02	
Pedestrian		0.05	0.03	
	-	3		

Discuss the word "expected" first to refresh students' statistic knowledge.




Discuss in general how safety can be different at different roadway facilities, different locations, different time.






The purpose of this lecture is two-fold:


- 1.Understand how the crash data can be used to measure safety.
- 2.Understand the issues related to crash counts.




With a scientific definition of safety, now it is time to see how to measure safety in practice. In order to estimate the "expected" we need data, crash account (by severity and type) per time unit for a specific roadway fatality.




First, attention may be paid to the basis (crash data collection). There are problems in crash data collection.




First of all, what is a crash?



Explain "harmful event."




Not all crashes are reported due to various reasons. For example, in Louisiana crashes involving animals are not all recorded.




In the U.S. different state uses different threshold for "reportable crashes."


Some states require recording all crashes with more than \$300 estimated damages, other \$1,000 or different numbers.

Who can accurately estimate damages?



Let student get familiar with KABCO terms.





There are two basic ideas:


1. Events of lesser severity are more numerous than more severe events, and events closer to the base of the triangle precede events nearer the top

2. Events near the base of the triangle occur more frequently than events near the triangle's top, and their rate of occurrence can be more reliably estimated


It is now known that for many circumstances, such as pedestrian crashes to seniors, almost every accident leads to injury. For these circumstances, the "No Injury crashes" layer is much narrower than the one shown in the Figure.

Furthermore, it is also known that, for many circumstances, preventing events of lesser severity may not translate into a reduction of events of larger severity. An example is the installation of a median barrier where the barrier increases the number of injury crashes due to hits of the barrier, but reduces fatalities by largely eliminating cross-median crashes. In the case of median barriers, the logic of Heinrich Triangle' does not apply because the events that lead to fatalities.

Ref: H. W. Heinrich, Industrial Accident Prevention, 1950, p. 24.




Again, reported crashes varies by several factors.




In general, fatal crashes, crashes involving more people, and crashes on major streets patrolled by state troops are more likely to be reported.



The numbers may not be completely accurate but they do reveal the problem.




How to define a crash fatality? Victim died instantly, or within certain number of days (7, 30 or 100?)




Electronic data collection technology traffic safety data. Vehicle sensors, long-range radar, optical sensors, lane detection404 and the vehicle event data recorder (EDR) systems will provide data about crash avoidance and causation. The changes in vehicle speed before and at the time of the crash, the principal direction of force and the exact latitude and longitude of the crash location will be collected in conjunction with the vehicle's automatic crash notification (ACN) and global positioning systems (GPS). Infrared or "smart card" technology will scan or swipe electronic driver license and vehicle registration data into a handheld device, such as a Personnel Data Assistant (PDA), tablet, clipboard, or laptop. The handheld device will directly access the driver and vehicle in a few seconds.


The handheld device will generate the case number, date, time, and latitude/longitude when the crash report is initiated. EDR data will be entered along with the "swiped or scanned" license and registration data. Drop-down menus, optical character recognition, speech recognition, intelligent screens and other technologies as well as linkage to other appropriate databases, such as the roadway database, and built-in logical and validity data edits will ensure accuracy. Driver and vehicle data will be simultaneously uploaded or downloaded into a mobile data terminal to update the history files at the State DMV...




FHWA, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, and NHTSA have jointly developed the (MMUCC). The purpose of these criteria is "to provide a data set for describing crashes of motor vehicles that will generate the information necessary to improve highway safety."




Agencies from emergency service, medical service, enforcement and etc. This has resulted in enhanced and more comprehensive information about reportable crashes.




Again discuss ROM and Non-linear relationship between crash frequency and AADT



Few real world examples can be introduced here to demonstrate the points.




Now let's consider volume.



However, rate also has its weakness in application.

Point A and point B could represent the same segment of road where no treatments were implemented from year 1 to year 2. However, the traffic volume on this road segment increased from 2,500 veh/day (point A) to 3,000 veh/day (point B) from year 1 to year 2. It is noted that at point B, the expected accident frequency is higher and the accident rate is lower when compared with point A. The decrease in accident rate means that, from an individual driver's point of view, travel in year 2 was safer than in year 1 because the probability of being in an accident has diminished. However, the road has not become safer as a result of higher traffic volumes.



These surrogates assume knowledge of the degree to which safety is expected to change when the surrogate measure changes by a given amount. For example, number of conflicts.

Relationship between number of expected crashes and number of surrogate events

$$\hat{\mu} = \sum_{i} \hat{C}_{i} \hat{p}_{i}$$

Where:


 $\hat{\mu}$ = the safety of a roadway or facility estimated by means of surrogate events \hat{C}_i = estimate of the rate surrogate event occurrence for the roadway or facility for each severity class i. The estimate is obtained by field observation, by simulation, or by analysis

 $\hat{p}_i^{}$ = estimate of the crash/surrogate event ratio for the roadway or facility for each severity class i. The estimate is the product of research that uses data about the occurence of surrogate events and of crashes on a set of roadways or facilities


LOUISIANA

Surrogate Measure	Description
Encroachment Time (ET)	Time duration during which the turning vehicle infringes upon the right- of-way of through vehicle.
Gap Time (GT)	Time lapse between completion of encroachment by turning vehicle and the arrival time of crossing vehicle if they continue with same speed and path.
Deceleration Rate (DR)	Rate at which through vehicle needs to decelerate to avoid accident.
Proportion of Stopping Distance (PSD)	Ratio of distance available to maneuver to the distance remaining to the projected location of accident.
Post-Encroachment Time (PET)	Time lapse between end of encroachment of turning vehicle and the time that the through vehicle actually arrives at the potential point of accident.
Initially Attempted Post- Encroachment Time (IAPT)	Time lapse between commencement of encroachment by turning vehicle plus the expected time for the through vehicle to reach the point of accident and the completion time of encroachment by turning vehicle.
Time to Collision (TTC)	Expected time for two vehicles to collide if they remain at their present speed and on the same path.


Ref: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/safety/03050/03050.pdf




The challenge is to establish quantitative relationship between surrogate measures and safety. And these relationships could vary by location (local culture and drivers' mentality).




For example, it is possible to establish an SPF between the expected frequency of single-vehicle crashes and the AADT for two-lane rural roads. This SPF predicts the average number of single-vehicle crashes on a two-lane rural road with a given AADT. SPFs may also express the relationship between the expected number of crashes and AADT and many more factors alternatively called "variables" or "covariates" (More on SFP later).







Refresh fundamental statistics related to safety analysis. It is critical to apply and develop the statistical method correctly for safety analysis. If you look at highway safety in any transportation textbook (published 5 years ago), you will see the statistical highway safety analysis methods that are no longer used in today highway safety analysis.

Remember the saying "Lies, damn lies, and statistics."




The purpose of this lecture is to refresh student knowledge on some fundamental statistics, which is key in safety analysis and modeling.







• To see how "outlier" affects the sample statistics





Outliers have minimum, or if any, effect on median.





Outliers have minimum, or if any, effect on mode also.















As all estimates are subject to uncertainty, the accuracy of an estimate is required in order to know the relationship between the estimate and reality. This is why, as a rule, safety estimates are accompanied by a description of their accuracy.


There appear to be two different definitions of the standard error.

The standard error of a sample of <u>sample size</u> is the sample's <u>standard deviation</u> divided by square root of sample size.

The standard error of an estimate may also be defined as the square root of the estimated error <u>variance</u> of the quantity, as assumed here in our safety analysis



This is something that may appeal in safety modeling.




It is a commonly used distribution function for number of crashes.


Poisson distribution is a discrete probability distribution that expresses the probability of a number of events occurring in a fixed period of time if these events occur with a known average rate, and are independent of the time since the last event. The Poisson distribution can also be used for other specified intervals such as: distance, area or volume.

A classic example is the probability of a certain number of bombs striking a randomly selected area from a group of equally sized areas. This example was applied to German V-1 buzz bombs (a flying bomb, the precurser to the guided missile) striking South London during WW II. On paper, South London was divided geographically into 576 areas each having 0.25km2 areas. Assuming the 535 bombs launched toward South London were done so with random targeting. Therefore, the probability of any number of bombs (0 to 535) striking any area of the 576, at random, can be calculated. For use in the Poisson distribution, the mean, λ , is the quotient of number of bombs divided by number of equally sized areas.


LOUISIANA




Examples are from the Internet. The Possion distribution is best for modeling events that are highly random in nature.



Discuss how the shapes change as the mean changes.






Such a success/failure experiment is also called a Bernoulli experiment or Bernoulli trial. In fact, when n = 1, the binomial distribution *is* a Bernoulli distribution.

Probability mass function


 In general, if the random variable K follows the binomial distribution with parameters n and p, we write K ~ B(n, p). The probability of getting exactly k successes is given by the probability mass function:


$$f(k;n,p) = \binom{n}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-k}$$

LOUISIANA




However, the k successes can occur anywhere among the n trials, and there are C(n, k) different ways of distributing k successes in a sequence of n trials.







Ask students why is one in column and one is continuous? Normal distribution is for continuous random variables.




However, the specific number varies from source to source, and depends on how good an approximation one wants; some sources give 10.






To analyze crash data in traffic safety analysis, statistical distributions are often used to fit the data. It is often assumed that the distribution of crash counts at a given site follows a Poisson distribution, which only has one parameter and its mean and variance are the same. The Poisson distribution has been shown to be reasonable to model crash data at a given one site. In reality, crash data over a series of sites often exhibit a large variance and a small mean, and display overdispersion with a variance-to-mean value greater than one. For this reason, the negative binomial distribution, also known as the Poisson-Gamma distribution, has become the most commonly used probabilistic distribution for modeling crashes. The negative binomial distribution is considered to be able to handle overdisperson better than other distributions and has been widely used in many fields in addition to traffic safety, such as entomology, zoology, bacteriology and biology.



The family of negative binomial distributions is a two-parameter family. One very common parameterization employs two real-valued parameters p and r with 0 and <math>r > 0. Under this parameterization, the probability mass function of a random variable with a NegBin(r, p) distribution takes the following form ...



	Summary	
Probability Function	Mean	Variance
Poisson (mean equals to variance)	λ	λ
Binomial (mean is bigger than variance)	nρ	np(1-p)
Negative Binomial (variance is bigger than mean)	$\frac{r(1-p)}{p}$	$\frac{r(1-p)}{p^2}$

Overdispersed Poisson

(variance exceeds the sample mean)

- If a Poisson distribution is used to model such data, the model mean and variance are equal. In that case, the observations are *overdispersed* with respect to the Poisson model.
- The negative binomial distribution can be used as an alternative to the Poisson distribution when sample variance exceeds the sample mean.


LOUISIANA


• Since the negative binomial distribution has one more parameter than the Poisson, the second parameter can be used to adjust the variance independently of the mean




• Empirical Bayes methods are a class of methods which use empirical data to evaluate or approximate the conditional probability distribution that arise from <u>Bayes' theorem</u>. These methods allow one to estimate quantities (probability, average, etc.) about an individual member of a population by combining information from empirical measurements on the individual and on the entire population

LOUISIANA








The increase in precision is important when the usual estimate is too imprecise to be useful. The elimination of the regression to mean bias is important whenever the crash history of the entity is in some way connected with the reason why its safety is estimated.


An intuitive explanation

The Empirical Bayes is based on the recognition that crash counts are not the only clue to the safety of a highway segment. Another clue is in what is known about the safety of similar sites.


Consider a novice taxi driver in New York who had no accident during his first year on the job. It is also known that an average novice taxi driver in the city has 0.08 crashes per year. It would not be correct to claim that this novice taxi driver is expected to have zero accident next year (based on his record only). It would also be peculiar to estimate his safety to be 0.08 accident/year (by disregarding his record). A sensitive estimate must be a mixture of the two clues.









The dispersion parameter comes from a Negative Binomial Distribution. It is discovered that crash counts are usually widely dispersed than what would be consistent with the Poisson assumption.





Materials in this section are mainly from the 2013 SFP workshop by Dr. Ezra Hauer. It is critical for students understand the safety model evaluation for the application purpose.





An analyst should expect a model to err in predicting a response in a random fashion; the model should predict values higher than actual and lower than actual with equal probability. Departures from this assumption usually mean that the residuals contain *structure* that is not accounted for in the model. Identifying that structure and adding term(s) representing it to the original model leads to a better model.

















The objective of this lecture is to let students understand the purpose and history of safety models and key issues in safety model development.






Explain briefly how roadway safety has evolved from qualitative to quantitative. Take the ASHTO HSM as an example.




Discuss the need for safety predictive models in project decision making process.



Facing multiple options for a project, Decision Makers need to know which one is better and by how much.



To make a sound decision, we must weigh in on all factors. There are often conflicts between factors, for example, cost and safety.



Lack of quantitative tools for safety evaluation was a problem in the past.

CAL3QHC Modeling Methodology for Predicting Pollutant Concentrations Near Roadway Intersections


MOBILE5a - Vehicle Emission Modeling Software

CORSIM Microscopic Traffic Simulation Model


PASSER Series of programs are <u>traffic control optimization</u> programs designed by <u>Texas Transportation Institute</u>

Transyt7f Traffic Network Study Tool

VISSIM Transportation planning, traffic engineering and traffic simulation




Two key elements in safety model development: data (availability and accuracy) and modeling techniques.




	Parametric	Nonparametric
Advantages	 More efficient and sensitive when assumptions are met. Simple to formulate and faster to compute. 	 Fewer assumptions, thus distribution free No parameters to estimate Can handle any kind of data.
Disadvantages	 If assumptions are incorrect, results of parametric methods can be very misleading. Not always robust. Difficulties arise in handling categorical data. 	 Less sensitive than parametric methods when the parametric models' assumptions are met. Less efficient than parametric methods when assumptions are met. Requires larger database and difficult to calculate.


A thorough discussion on the two different modeling techniques is needed here with examples prepared by instructors in his/her familiar research areas.



Here is an example from parametric safety model. It demonstrates the quantitative difference in expected crash numbers between two roadways under different terrains.





Ideally, a safety model should include all crash contributing factors as discussed in the introduction.




We know for sure vehicles today are much safer than vehicles 10, 20, 30, 50 years ago. All vehicle safety features today are collectively making a (huge) difference on crashes occurrences and severity. But it is hard to independently estimate the impact quantitatively.

Ask students "Any suggestions from you?"







For the safety models, we have to focus on roadway feature now (lack of data from other E areas).




The spiral chart is from Dr. Huaer's workshop on Highway Safety Models conducted in 2013 (at Washington D.C. and Louisiana). The remaining lecture on this topic is mainly from his workshop except the data analysis example.




This issues has been discussed in previous lecture.




The modeler has to make a variety of choices: what traits (variables) to use to define the populations, what functions to use for combining the variables into a model equation, what should be minimized of maximized to obtain a good fit, how can the fit be improved, which data points are outliers, etc. These choices depend on the exercise of insight. This section is about developing initial insight into what the data suggest.




EDA is an approach to understanding the message of data. More on the next slide.






EDA is a popular data exploring step used by data modeling people in all fields.




Rural two-lane highways in Louisiana carry one-third of the total vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and have experienced a considerably high percentage of fatal crashes. There were12,467 crashes on rural two-lane highways in Louisiana in 2010.

		Sampl	e of t	ne d	ata	
LENGTH	ADT	PAVE_WIDTH	SHOU_WIDTH	TOT ACC	INT ACC	
LENGTH	1.85	3300	24	6	0	0
	0.14	3300	24	6	0	0
	0.53	3300	24	8	1	0
	1.69	4800	24	6	3	0
	0.11	4800	24	0	0	0
	0.06	3300	24	0	0	0
	0.63	4300	24	6	0	0
	1.03	4300	24	7	0	Questionable
	0.56	8600	24	8	0	0
	1.23	5000	24	9	1	1
	0.36	5000		15	0	0
	0.23	9900	1	14	2	2
	1.06	9900	24	9	1	0
	4.45	4100	24	V	6	3
	0.42	1850	24	4	1	0
	7.6	1850	24	7	0	0
	0.7	1430	24	7	0	0
	0.05	1430		11	0	0
	0.42	2800	24	7	0	0

Discuss why these data are questinable.




It is important to point out that there are almost no "perfect" data in real world.



If possible, instructor should spend sometime in class on Pivot Table application.

																																		ount of
																																xets -	Column La <0 or	DT_ACC
arand 1	-17.5 G	15.5 17-	-15 15-	5 14.5	14-14.5	5 13.5-	13-13	12.5-13	-12.5 12	5-12 12	11.5 11	5-11 11-	10.5 10	-10 10-	9.5 9.5	599	-8.5 8	.5-8 8	1-7.5	6.5-7	6-6.5	5 5.5	5-5 5-1	4.5 4	154 4	3-3.5 3	533	2.5 2	5-2 2	-1.5 1	15-1 1	0-0.5 0		ow Labels
																																		(ank)
		1			1			1		2		B	5	4	8	9	13	17	35	35	T (73	64	62	78	101	93	119		150					999
				1					2		4	2	2	2	7	7	13	14	18	18	4 24	37	57	51	43	78	- 69	79	93	113				000-1999
			1			1		1	1	1			1	2	5	4	5	6	8	11	8 18	20	27	21	28	37	47	-54	42	74	143	206		000-2999
	1										2	1	1	3	4	1	2	7	5	10	0 9	12	25	18	18	27	34	41	40	51	96	146		000-3999
										1			2	1	1	2	3	- 4	7	3	8 3	8	14	12	14	11	25	29	35	30	86	109		000-4999
											1	2		1			1	1	1	2	4 4	7	5	5	8	13	13	20	23	20	38	84		000-5999
														1			1	1	4	1	3 7	5	6	6	11	10	11	14	26	20	36	57		000-6999
									1									1			1	4	4	4	3	8	10	13	12	16	38	39		000-7999
										1											2 2	7	2	5	1	3	3	8	8	22	20	35		000-8999
																	1		1		2	1	1	2	2	5	1	6	5	7	18	30		000-9999
																1					1	2	1	2	2	5	1	4	3	7	8	21		0000-10999
									1										1		1 1		1	1	2	2	3	4	3	10	9	21		1000-11999
																					1 1			1	1	1	1	1	3		2	13		2000-12999
																							2		1		2	2	3	4	4	6		3000-13999
																							1		1		1	1	2	3	1	6		4000-14999
																									3	1	1				1	7		5000-15000
																				2									2			3		5000-16999
																										1			э	1	1	2		7000-17999
																										'		2			1	,		000-18999
																														1				000-19999
																										2					1	3		0000-20999
																															2	2		1000-21999
																															1	1		2000-22999
																															1			000-24999
																													1		1	1		5000-25999
																		-		1100						-		1		-		1		5000-27000
	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	5	5	7	13	11	14	25	24	39	51	80	82	1 106	67 1	208	206	239	298	341	423	454	565	159	1500		rand Total

Each cell represents total crashes in that population group defined by AADT (presented by each row) and segment length (by column). Applying Excel tool Pivot Table, the average, standard deviation and count can be displayed.



Discuss the relationship between simple size and reliability of average crashes in each cell.

AADT 🔄	0-0.5	0.5-1	1-1.5	1.5-2	2-2.5	2.5-3	3-3.5	3.5-4	4-4.5	4.5-5	5-5.5	5.5-6	6-6.5	6.5-7	7-7.5	
0-999	0.10	0.27	0.39	0.64	0.73	0.85	1.02	1.77	1.60	0.89	1.42	1.65	1.75	1.51	2.46	
1000-1999	0.31	0.88	1.11	1.27	1.62	2.19	2.96	3.35	3.98	3.67	3.65	3.91	4.25	5.78	4.33	
2000-2999	0.55	1.14	1.64	3.12	2.98	2.79	2.51	5.07	3.71	5.22	7.85	4.67	8.39	5.91	11.63	
3000-3999	0.71	1.52	2.27	3.28	2.95	4.12	6.11	4.83	9.61	7.96	9.50	10.67	7.56	7.70	9.40	
4000-4999	1.08	2.26	4.17	4.26	7.83	3.80	3.91	6.64	5.42	6.21	8.38	14.38	11.00	17.67	10.86	
5000-5999	1.54	2.18	5.20	4.87	7.65	4.23	7.54	5.13	15.00	5.80	7.14	15.50	13.25	9.50	6.00	
6000-6999	1.14	2.03	4.30	5.42	6.71	15.45	12.20	11.73	13.33	9.83	8.00	25.67	14.57	10.00	19.50	
7000-7999	2.08	3.00	4.50	6.83	7.38	12.70	14-13	6.83	10.25	16.00	16.75	14.00	5			
8000-8999	2.03				13.63											
9000-9999					14.17										8.00	
10000-10999			-		23.25								23.00		0.00	
11000-11999	-				9.25								0.00		41.00	
12000-12999		6.00			20.00										41.00	
		0.00		21.55	20.00	5.00	10.00	10.00	10.00			17.00	25.00			
Count L AADT 70-0	× .5 0.5		27	×.	-2.5 2							Ċ.			7-7.5	ſ
	1		27	×.	•					4.5-5	5-5.5	5.5-6	6-6.5			ĺ
AADT0-0	.5 0.9	5-1 1-1	1.5 1.	5-2 2	-2.5 2	.5-3	3-3.5	3.5-4	4-4.5 78	4.5-5 62	5-5.5 64	5.5-6	6-6.5 8 3	6.5-7	5 35	
AADT C-0 0-999 1000-1999 2000-2999	359	5-1 1- 265 208 143	1.5 1. 186	5-2 2 150 93 42	- 2.5 2 144	. 5-3 119 69 47	3-3.5 93 78 37	3.5-4 101 43 28	4-4.5 78 51 21	4.5-5 62 57 27	5-5.5 9 64 9 37 9 20	5.5-6 1 41 7 34	6-6.5 8 3 4 2	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 18 11	5 35 B 18 1 8	
AADT C.0-0 0-999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999	359 347 206 146	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51	5-2 2 - 150 93 42 40	- 2.5 2 144 79 54 41	. 5-3 119 69 47 34	3-3.5 93 78 37 27	3.5-4 101 43 28 18	4-4.5 78 51 21 18	4.5-5 62 57 27 25	5-5.5 64 37 20	5.5-6 4 44 7 34 0 14	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9	6.5-7 6 35 4 18 8 11 9 10	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5	ſ
AADT C-00 0-999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999	359 347 206 146 109	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30	5-2 2- 150 93 42 40 35	- 2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29	119 69 47 34 25	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14	4-4.5 78 51 21 18 12	4.5-5 62 57 27 25 14	5-5.5 64 37 20 12	5.5-6 4 41 7 34 0 11 2 9 3 4	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 11 9 10 3 3	5 35 B 18 1 8 0 5 3 7	¢
AADT C-000 0-999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999 5000-5999	359 347 206 146 109 84	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86 38	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30 20	5-2 2. 150 93 42 40 35 23	- 2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29 20	119 69 47 34 25 13	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11 13	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14 8	4-4.5 78 51 21 18 12 5	4.5-5 62 57 27 25 14 5	5-5.5 64 37 20 5 12 8 8	5.5-6 4 44 7 3- 0 11 2 9 3 4	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9 8	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 11 9 10 3 3 4 2	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5 3 7 2 1	e.
AADT C.999 0.999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999 5000-5999 6000-6999	359 347 206 146 109 84 57	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86 38 36	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30 20 20	5-2 2 150 93 42 40 35 23 26	- 2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29 20 14	5-3 119 69 47 34 25 13 11	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11 13 10	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14 8 14 8 11	4-4.5 78 51 21 18 12 5	4.5-5 62 57 27 25 14 5	5-5.5 2 64 37 20 5 12 4 8	5.5-6 4 44 7 3- 0 11 2 9 3 4 5 3	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9 8 4 3	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 11 9 10 3 3	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5 3 7 2 1	
AADT C-000 0-999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999 5000-5999	359 347 206 146 109 84	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86 38	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30 20	5-2 2. 150 93 42 40 35 23	- 2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29 20	119 69 47 34 25 13	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11 13	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14 8	4-4.5 78 51 21 18 12 5	4.5-5 62 57 27 25 14 5	5-5.5 64 37 20 5 12 8 8	5.5-6 4 44 7 3- 0 11 2 9 3 4 5 3 4	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9 8 4 3 1	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 11 9 10 3 3 4 2	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5 3 7 2 1	
AADT C.999 0.999 1000-1999 2000-2999 3000-3999 4000-4999 5000-5999 6000-6999 7000-7999	359 347 206 146 109 84 57 39	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86 38 36 38 36 38	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30 20 20 16	5-2 2- 150 93 42 40 35 23 26 12	- 2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29 20 14 13	.5-3 119 69 47 34 25 13 11 10	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11 13 10	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14 8 11 3	4-4.5 78 51 21 18 12 5 6	4.5-5 62 57 25 14 5	5-5.5 6 4 3 7 2 0 5 12 4 8 5 4 4 7 7 12 12 12 14 15 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17	5.5-6 4 44 7 3- 2 9 3 1 2 9 3 1 5 1 5 1 4	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9 8 4 3 1	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 11 9 10 3 3 4 2 7 1	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5 3 7 2 1	
AADT	359 347 206 146 109 84 57 39 35	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86 38 36 38 36 38 20	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30 20 20 16 22	5-2 2 150 93 42 40 35 23 26 12 8	-2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29 20 14 13 8	.5-3 119 69 47 34 25 13 11 10	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11 13 10 8 3	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14 8 11 3 1	4-4.5 78 51 21 18 12 5 6 4 5 2	4.5-5 62 57 25 14 5 4	5-5.5 5-5.5 5-5.5 5-5.5 5-5 5-5 5-	5.5-6 4 44 7 3- 2 9 3 1 2 9 3 1 5 1 5 1 4	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9 8 4 3 1 2 2	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 11 9 10 3 3 4 2 7 1	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5 3 7 2 1	
AADT Image: Constraint of the second se	359 347 206 146 109 84 57 39 35 30	5-1 1- 265 208 143 96 86 38 36 38 20 18	1.5 1. 186 113 74 51 30 20 20 16 22 7	5-2 2 150 93 42 40 35 23 26 12 8 5	-2.5 2 144 79 54 41 29 20 14 13 8	.5-3 119 69 47 34 25 13 11 10 3 1	3-3.5 93 78 37 27 11 13 10 8 3 5	3.5-4 101 43 28 18 14 8 11 3 1 2	4-4.5 78 51 12 18 12 5 6 4 5 2 2 2 1	4.5-5 62 57 25 14 5 4 1 1 1	5-5.5 2 64 37 20 5 12 4 8 5 4 4 7 1 2	5.5-6 1 44 7 3-4 0 12 2 9 3 12 2 9 3 14 	6-6.5 8 3 4 2 8 1 9 8 4 3 1 2 2 1	6.5-7 16 35 14 18 8 11 9 10 3 3 4 2 7 1 2	5 35 8 18 1 8 0 5 3 7 2 1	


Same table but enlarged

2.82							11-11.5		12-12.5		13-13.5		-14.5 14	.5-15		/-1/.5	Grand Total
			2.50	3.50	1.80	2.88	7.50	1.50	2.50	7.00		6.00	0.00		4.00		0.8
			6.86	12.00	6.00	18.00	7.50	2.00	3.50	2.00	0.00		8.00				1.8
13.00 14.43				9.00 10.33	21.00 18.00	0.00	0.00	2.00	10.00	2.00	9.00			10.00		10.00	2.74
			31.50	10.33	14.50	0.00	8.00	6.00								18.00	4.0
	8.33	9.00		147.00	14.50	25.00	8.00	6.00									4.0
21.00				13.00		25.00	8.00										6.2
25.00	9.00			13.00					62.00								6.3
25.00								16.00	62.00								8.60
	45.00							10.00									7.10
		10.00															9.4
		10.00							8.00								7.8
									0.00								8.8
7.5-8	8-8.5	8.5-9	9-9.5	9.5-10	10-10.5	10.5-11	11-11.5	11.5-12	12-12.5	12.5-13	13-13.5	13.5-14	14-14.5 1	4.5-15	15-15.5	17-17.5	Grand Tot
7.5-8	8-8.5	8.5-9	9-9.5	9.5-10	10-10.5	10.5-11	11-11.5	11.5-12	12-12.5	12.5-13	13-13.5	13.5-14	14-14.5 1	4.5-15	15-15.5	17-17.5	Grand Tot
17	13	3 9)	8 4	5	8		2	1	1		13.5-14 1		14.5-15	15-15.5	17-17.5	18
17 14	13 13	3 3	ə i 7	8 4 7 2	5	8		2	2	2	i	1	14-14.5		1	17-17.5	18 13
17 14 6	13 13 9		9 1 7 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2	5	8 2	4	2	2	2	i	1		1 4.5-15	1		184 133 71
17 14 6 7	13 13 5 2		9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3	5	8 2 1	4	2	! 2	2	i	1			1	17-17.5	18 13 7: 1 5
17 14 6 7 4	13 13 5 2		9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3 1 1	5 2 1 1 2	8 2 1	4	2 1 1	! 2	2	i	1			1		184 133 71 1 56 44
17 14 6 7 4	13 13 2 2 3		9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3 1 1	5 2 1 1 2	8 2 1	4	2 1 1	! 2	2	i	1			1		184 133 74 1 56 44 25
17 14 6 7 4 1	13 13 5 2		9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3 1 1	5 2 1 1 2	8 2 1	4	2 1 1	י ג ג	2 L 1	i	1			1		184 133 74 1 56 44 29 22
17 14 6 7 4	13 13 2 2 3		9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3 1 1	5 2 1 1 2	8 2 1	4	1	: . 1	2 L 1	i	1			1		40 25 25 15
17 14 6 7 4 1	13 13 2 2 3 1 1	8 9 8 7 8 7	9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3 1 1	5 2 1 1 2	8 2 1	4	2 1 1	: . 1	2 L 1	i	1			1		18 13: 7 1 5 4 4 2: 2: 1: 1: 1:
17 14 6 7 4 1	13 13 2 2 3	8 9 8 7 8 7	9 1 7 1 1 1	8 4 7 2 5 2 4 3 1 1	5 2 1 1 2	8 2 1	4	1	: . 1	2 L 1	i	1			1		184 133 74 1 56 44 29 21 21 11

Stress the problem of smaller sample size with segment of longer length.

			557-5555	e anter				10100 N. 1954		and the states				
13000-13999	2.17	9.00	15.00	18.00	27.00	28.50		90.00		32.00				
14000-14999	3.17	4.00	13.00	10.50	8.00	13.00		10.00		24.00				
15000-15999	8.00	7.00				45.00	13.00	58.67						
16000-16999	2.67			21.00										24.50
17000-17999	16.00	0.00	10.00	17.67			13.00							
18000-18999	1.00	49.00	0		41.00		55.00							
19000-19999			50.00		12100		55100							
20000-20999		0.00					23.00							
21000-21999		24.50					23.00							
22000-22999		28.00												
24000-24999		1.00												
25000-25999	7.00	5.00		25.00										
26000-27000	5.00				29.00									
Grand Total	0.76	1.56	2.33	3.05	3.79	3.55	4.54	5.47	4.93	4.62	5.69	6.33	5.97	5.24
13000-13999	6	4	4	3	2	2		1		2				
14000-14999	6	1	3	2	1	1		1		1				
15000-15999	7	1				1	1	3						
16000-16999	3			2									2	
17000-17999	2	1	1	3			1							
18000-18999	1	1			2		1							
19000-19999			1											
20000-20999	3	1					2							
21000-21999	2	2												
22000-22999	1	1		In	suffi	cient	obse	rvati	ons v	vith	bigge	r AAI	DT	
24000-24999		1												
25000-25999	1	1		1										
26000-27000	1	~~			1									
		981	565	454		341 2	98 2	39 20	06 20	16	57 13	1 10	6 82	
														UNI

• Similarly, the problem of smaller sample size with higher AADT




Discuss the charts:

1.Is there a trend?

2. Why curves are smoother when value of variable are small?

3. Why curves are irregular when values of variables are bigger?




Discussion summary

		/ .		\ T			~					• •			
		(A	AL	וו	an	dł	Pav	′en	ne	nt	W	'Id'	th)	
		`												, 	
Row Labels	10	16	18	19	20	21	22	24	25	26	28	30	34	36 G	rand Total
0-999	0	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.34	0.61			2.00				0.27
1000-1999		0.67	0.92		0.63		1.02	1.16		0.00	2.00				0.88
2000-2999			0.50		1.12		1.06	1.27	1.00	0.00	0.00				1.14
3000-3999			0.00		1.50		1.00	1.98		3.00	0.00				1.52
4000-4999			2.00		1.89		5.92	1.53	2.00	1.00			4.00		2.26
5000-5999			3.00		4.00		4.00	1.59		5.00		0.00			2.18
6000-6999			0.00		5.00		3.50	1.52		7.00				1.00	2.03
7000-7999			1.00		3.50		2.75	3.04			4.00				3.00
8000-8999					7.50			4.22							4.55
9000-9999					15.00		12.00	4.79							6.56
10000-10999					0.00			5.86							5.13
11000-11999								7.38		3.00					6.89
12000-12999								6.00							6.00
13000-13999								9.00							9.00
14000-14999								4.00							4.00
15000-15999					7.00										7.00
17000-17999								0.00							0.00
18000-18999								49.00							49.00
20000-20999								0.00							0.00
21000-21999							44.00	5.00							24.50
22000-22999					28.00										28.00
24000-24999								1.00							1.00
25000-26000					5.00										5.00
Grand Total	0	0.29	0.50	0.00	0.88	0.00	1.86	2.15	1.50	1.82	1.67	0.00	4.00	1.00	4 50

Further analysis is performed by examining the impact of pavement width. Here segment length is fixed at 1.0 to 1.499 miles. It is well known that safety is related to lane width in rural 2-lane highways. Do you see that in this table?

It seems we only see that when AADT is higher than 5,000.





But sample sizes are small.

(\sim	nc	hi		rin	a	# /	∽£	2	20	or		\+i	or	
Ľ	-0	115	JU	e	111	g	# (וכ	Or	72	ei	۷c	111	ΟI	12
Row Labels	10	16	18	19	20	21	22	24	25	26	28	30	34	36 G	irand Total
0-999	0	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.18	0.00	0.34	0.61			2.00				0.27
1000-1999		0.67	0.92		0.63	1	1.02	1.16		0.00	2.00				0.88
2000-2999			0.50		1.12		1.06	1.27	1.00	0.00	0.00				1.14
3000-3999			0.00		1.50		1.00	1.98		3.00	0.00				1.52
4000-4999			2.00		1.89		5.92	1.53	2.00	1.00			4.00		2.26
5000-5999			3.00		4.00		4.00	1.59		5.00		0.00			2.18
6000-6999			0.00		5.00		3.50	1.52		7.00				1.00	2.03
7000-7999			1.00		3.50	-	2.75	3.04			4.00				3.00
8000-8999					7.50	_		4.22	_						4.55
9000-9999					15.00		12.00	4.79							6.56
10000-10999					0.00			5.86							5.13
11000-11999						_		7.38		3.00					6.89
12000-12999								6.00							6.00
13000-13999								9.00							9.00
14000-14999								4.00							4.00
15000-15999					7.00										7.00
17000-17999								0.00							0.00
18000-18999								49.00							49.00
20000-20999								0.00							0.00
21000-21999							44.00	5.00							24.50
22000-22999					28.00										28.00
24000-24999								1.00							1.00
25000-26000					5.00										5.00
Grand Total	0	0.29	0.50	0.00	0.88	0.00	1.86	2.15	1.50	1.82	1.67	0.00	4.00	1.00	1.56

Again, What does this table reveal?


- 1. Average crashes increase as AADT increases (already known from the first Pivot table)
- 2. Average crashes decrease with lane width increasing to 12 ft. At high AADT level.






Another example showing AADT vs. average crashes per segment at three segment length.

Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA



Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA




After EDA, it is time to formulate model structure. Two key questions:


- 1. Model functional form
- 2. Number of variables

Linear	$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2$
Power	X ^β
Polynomial	$L + \beta L^2$
Hoerl	$X^{\beta_1}e^{\beta_2 X}$
Others	$e^{\sum \beta_i X_i}$
Mixtures	$\hat{E}\{\mu\} = \beta_0 L^{\beta_1} A A D T^{\beta_2} e^{\beta_3 A A D T}$


Determining what function hides behind the noisy data is key to getting good estimates of $E\{\mu\}$ and $\sigma\{\mu\}.$




There is only general guidance on the selection of functional form. Developing appropriate functional form requires lots of trial and error.




As most engineering students learned in statistics, there are several methods for parameter estimation. Different methods yield different results.




OLS is one of the most common methods used in parameter estimation.




Where x-axes is independent variable and Y-axes presents the dependent variable. Each dot presents a observed data and red line presents the model.



MLE has a totally different objective from OLS.




MLE can be expressed mathematically as in the slide.



Does the developed model work well? This question must be answer by model evaluation process. Residual is a good measure of the model and can be visualized in a chart where x-axes presents independent variable and Y-axes is Res (observed minus predicted/fitted)


Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA




This residual plot may come from a developed model that has a good overall fit. By examining its distribution over one variable, it is clear that the model predictability varies depending on the value of independent variable. In safety model application, it may not be not acceptable.

Discuss why it is not acceptable in safety model application.

Chart comes from Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA




In addition to residue plot, the CURE plot is also very helpful in model evaluation. Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA




Having a perfect CURE is hard. We need some kind of yardstick to evaluate CURE.

Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA




Continuing the discussion on why overall fit is not good enough for safety model application.

For example, you are doing network screening by using EB method.





SPF development is not predefined sequence of steps; it is a gradual progress towards a satisfactory result consisting of steps and missteps.

Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA




Source: Dr. Hauer's 2013 SPF Workshop in Baton Rouge, LA







The objective of this lecture is to let student be familiar with the safety models for the three types of highways from the first edition of the HSM.




Three chapters in the first edition of the HSM deal with safety models for three types of highways.




Also by segment and intersection because these two roadway facilities perform very differently in safety.




For consistence, all three types of highways (including two facilities type) have similar model structure. There are four elements in each model.




First three elements include SPF, Crash Modification Factors (CMF) and a calibration factor.



Base models are useful in predicting overall accident frequency, but their coefficients cannot necessarily be relied upon to represent the incremental effects of individual geometric design and traffic control features; therefore, the base models are not sufficient, by themselves, to make reliable predictions of safety performance of a highway facility (segment or intersection) because they are not necessarily sensitive to all of the geometric design and traffic control features.




Therefore, a CMF may serve as an estimate of the effect of a particular geometric design or traffic control feature or the effectiveness of a particular treatment or condition.




Differences in:

- Crash reporting thresholds, and crash reporting system procedures
- Weather condition
- Driver behavior




As introduced previously, there are two basic analysis elements for safety mode. This chart illustrates the classification of segment and intersection.




Due to the difference in cross-section design, the segment can be further grouped by median type and number of lanes. And intersection can be further grouped by type of traffic control and layout.

Discuss why further grouping is important.



The EB application model is straightforward—considering location special safety performance. The key is weighting factor, W.




Regression-to-the-mean bias is addressed as the method concentrates on long-term expected average crash frequency rather than short-term observed crash frequency.


Reliance on availability of limited crash data for any one site is reduced by incorporating predictive relationships based on data from many similar sites.

The method accounts for the fundamentally nonlinear relationship between crash frequency and traffic volume.

The SPFs are based on the <u>negative binomial distribution</u>, which is better suited for modeling the high natural variability of crash data than traditional modeling techniques, which are based on the normal distribution.



Only those geometric features whose relationship to safety is well understood are included in the procedure. It is likely that such interactions exist, and ideally, they should be accounted for in the safety prediction procedure; however, such interactions are poorly understood and difficult to quantify.




Three chapters in the first edition of HSM deal with safety models for three types of highways.




Introduce the overall models.

- ST as sign controlled
- SG as signalized
- The number indicated the intersection type, four leg or T intersection



Each segment must have uniform attributes, such as same lane width, shoulder width, and etc.



Note that only two variables are in base model.

Segment base of	condition
Shoulder width (SW)GShoulder typePRoadside hazard rating (RHR)3Driveway density (DD)5Horizontal curvatureNVertical curvatureNCenterline rumble stripsNPassing lanesNTwo-way left-turn lanesNLightingNAutomated speed enforcementN	12 feet 5 feet Paved 5 driveways per mile None None None None None None None
Lighting N Automated speed enforcement N	None None

Stress that other variables in base model are considered in "base condition" defined here.

A 0% grade is not allowed by most states because of drainage need.

The SPF uses 0% as a numerical base condition that must always be modified based on the actual grade.


	AADT (veh/day)		
Lane Width	< 400	400 to 2000	> 2000
9-ft or less	1.05	1.05+2.81x10 ⁻⁴ (AADT-400)	1.50
10-ft	1.02	1.02+1.75×10 ⁻⁴ (AADT-400)	1.30
11-ft	1.01	1.01+2.5x10 ⁻⁵ (AADT-400)	1.05
12-ft or more	1.00	1.00	1.00
'here,	iunen s	$CMF_{ra} - 1) imes P_{ra} + 1.0$	

For roadway variables not in base condition, a crash modification factor (CMF) is used. Here is an example for lane width.


Ref: Highway Safety Manual, 1st Edition by AASHTO

Shoulder Width		AADT (vehicles per day)			
	< 400	400 to 2000	> 2000		
0-ft	1.10	1.10 + 2.5 x 10 ⁻⁴ (AADT - 400)	1.50		
2-ft	1.07	1.07 + 1.43 x 10 ⁻⁴ (AADT - 400)	1.30		
4-ft	1.02	1.02 + 8.125 x 10 ⁻⁵ (AADT - 400)	1.15		
6-ft	1.00	1.00	1.00		
8-ft or more	0.98	0.98 + 6.875 x 10 ⁻⁵ (AADT - 400)	0.87		
road and multip	le-vehicle head-on,	opposite-direction sideswipe, and same-direction side	swipe accident		

Another example for shoulder width





CMF for driveway density is a function of traffic and driveway density.




Crash Severity Level on R Way Roadway		wo-
Crash Severity Level	% of Crashes	
Fatal	1.3	
Incapacitating Injury	5.4	
Nonincapacitating Injury	10.9	
Possible Injury	14.5	
Total Fatal Plus Injury	32.1	
PDO	67.9	
Total	100	

Remember these numbers are default numbers. Crash severity distribution may vary by state.





Three SPFs for intersection on rural two-lane highways. Only traffic volume is considered here.



Other variables are in "base condition" that is defined here.

	-	Numb	er of approache	es with left-tur	n lanes ª
Intersection type	Intersection traffic control	One approach	Two approaches	Three approaches	Four apprbaches
Three-leg intersection	Minor road stop control ^b	0.56	0.31	-	-
Four-leg	Minor road stop control ^b	0.72	0.52	-	-
intersection	Traffic signal	0.82	0.67	0.55	0.45
lanes	d approaches are not cons esent on minor road approa		nining the numbe	er of approaches	with left-turn


If the variable is not in base condition, use CMF. Here is the example for left-turnlanes.

		tribution		
EXHIBIT 2. DEFAULT DIST	RIBUTION FOR ACC		total accidents	ane Highways
Accident severity level	Roadway segments ^a	Three-leg STOP-controlled intersections ^b	Four-leg STOP-controlled intersections ^b	Four-leg signalized intersections ^b
Fatal	1.3	1.1	1.9	0.4
Incapacitating Injury	5.4	5.0	6.3	4.1
Nonincapacitating injury	10.9	15.2	12.8	12.0
Possible injury	14.5	18.5	20.7	21.2
Total fatal plus injury	32.1	39.8	41.7	37.7
Property damage only	67.9	60.2	58.3	62.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
 Based on HSIS data North Carolina (1995 Based on HSIS data).	••••		d
				LOUISIANA

Default values for crash severity distribution

		Percentage of	of total accidents	
Accident type and manner of collision	Roadway segments*	Three-leg STOP- controlled intersections⁵	Four-leg STOP- controlled intersections [®]	Four-leg signalized intersections⁵
SINGLE-VEHICLE ACCIDENTS				
Collision with animal	30.9	2.1	0.6	0.3
Collision with bicycle	0.3	0.7	0.3	1.0
Collision with parked vehicle	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1
Collision with pedestrian	0.5	0.4	0.2	1.3
Overturned	2.3	2.1	0.6	0.4
Ran off road	28.1	10.4	4.5	1.9
Other single-vehicle accident	3.6	3.9	1.4	1.6
Total single-vehicle accidents MULTIPLE-VEHICLE ACCIDENTS	66.3	19.7	7.7	6.6
Angle collision	3.9	29.8	51.4	28.5
Head-on collision	1.9	2.0	1.4	1.8
Left-turn collision	4.2	6.4	5.9	9.0
Right-turn collision	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.4
Rear-end collision	13.9	26.2	17.2	36.2
Sideswipe opposite-direction collision	2.4	2.9	1.7	2.0
Sideswipe same-direction collision	2.6	4.5	4.4	5.5
Other multiple-vehicle collision	4.1	8.1	10.1	10.0
Total multiple-vehicle accidents	33.7	80.3	92.3	93.4
TOTAL ACCIDENTS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Default crash type distribution, that may vary by state.




Now it is time to go over an sample to show how the safety model works.


					Ca	lculat	ions	5			
		N_{sq}	$_{pf} = A$	AD7	$T \times L >$	< 365 × 1	$ 0^{-6}>$	$< e^{-0.31}$	12		
		= 1	0,000	×1.5	×365	5×10^{-6}	$\times e^{-0}$.312			
		= 4	1.0008	s_cr	ashes	/ year					
Lan	ie widt	th CMF			(<i>CMF_{ra} - × 0.573 +</i>	$(-1) \times P_{ra} + (-1)$	1.0	Comb	ined C	:MFs =	= 1.38
	r lane idth	Shoulder width	Horizonta I curve	Grade	Driveway	Centerline rumble strips	Passing lane	Left turn lane	roadside	lighting	Automatic enforcement
1.	.17	1.09	1.00	1.00	1.01	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.07	1.00	1.00
									·		
				Fina	l resu	t=6.084	=6.1	crashe	es/yea	r	
										9	LOUISIANA


Note, it makes no sense to keep more than one decimal point in final result.


San	nple Applicati	0	n Two (segment)
	at is the predicted average crash freq		
The Fac	2		
•	0.1-mi length	•	0 driveways per mi
•	Curved roadway segment	•	11-ft lane width
•	8,000 veh/day	•	2-ft gravel shoulder
•	1% grade	•	Roadside hazard rating = 5
•	1,200-ft horizontal curve radius	•	0.1-mi horizontal curve length
•	No spiral transition	•	0.04 superelevation rate
Assump	otions		
	Collision type distributions have be percentage of total crashes representii multiple-vehicle head-on, opposite-dii sideswipe crashes is 78%.	ng s	ingle-vehicle run-off-the-road and
•	The calibration factor is assumed to be	1.10).
•	Design speed = 60 mph		
•	Maximum superelevation rate, e _{max} = 6	%	
			CONTRACTOR LOUISIANA

For a more comprehensive application like Sample Applications two, three, four and five, use the Excel Program.












The Excel Program developed by Dr. Karen Dixon is available online.




Three chapters in the first edition of the HSM deal with safety models for three types of highways.



Note the difference in segment from the previous model on rural two-lane highways.




4D – Divided highways are non freeway facilities (i.e., facilities without full control of access) that have the lanes in the two directions of travel separated by a raised, depressed or flush median which is not designed to be traversed by a vehicle; this may include raised or depressed medians, with or without a physical median barrier, flush medians with physical median barriers.



Base model is the same for both divided and undivided segments. K is used for EB application.

Crash Severity Level	а	b	с
,			-
total	-9.653	1.176	1.675
Fatal and injury	-9.410	1.094	1.796
A	-8.577	0.938	2.003
	sing KABCO scale and	d level C is not include Divided Rura	
* Us	sing KABCO scale and nts for 4-lane	Divided Rura	l Roadway
* Us	sing KABCO scale and		
* Us	sing KABCO scale and nts for 4-lane	Divided Rura	l Roadway
* Us Coefficie	sing KABCO scale and nts for 4-lane a	Divided Rura	l Roadway

Discuss the difference in coefficients between two types of segments and among three crash severity levels.



Again, define base conditions.

Base Condition for <u>Divided</u> Rura Highways	al Multilane
 Lane width (LW) 	12 feet
 Right Shoulder width 	8 feet
 Median Width 	30 feet
 Lighting 	None
 Automated speed enforcement 	None
	UNIVERSITY LOUISIANA


• Base condition definition

Γ		n of crashes by collision Severity			-
Collision type	Total	Fatal and injury	Fatal and injury ^a	PDO	-
Head-on	0.009	0.029	0.043	0.001	-
Sideswipe	0.098	0.048	0.044	0.120	-
Rear-end	0.246	0.305	0.217	0.220	 Undivide
Angle	0.356	0.352	0.348	0.358	-
Cinela	0.238	0.238	0.304	0.237	-
Single	0.230	0.230	0.504		
Other	0.053 scale, these include	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra	0.044 shes with severity level C		-
Other OTE: ^a Using the KABCO are not included	0.053 scale, these include	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra ion of crashes by collision	0.044 shes with severity level C	(possible injury)	-
Other OTE: ^a Using the KABCO	0.053 scale, these include	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra ion of crashes by collision	0.044 shes with severity level C on type and crash sever	(possible injury)	
Other OTE: ^a Using the KABCO are not included	0.053 scale, these include Proporti	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra on of crashes by collisi Severit	0.044 shes with severity level C on type and crash sever ty level	(possible injury) rity level	
Other ^a Using the KABCO are not included Collision type	0.053 scale, these include Proporti Total	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra on of crashes by collisio Severit Fatal and injury	0.044 shes with severity level C on type and crash sever ty level Fatal and injury ^a	(possible injury) rity level PDO	 Divided
Other OTE: ^a Using the KABCO are not included Collision type Head-on	0.053 scale, these include Proporti Total 0.006	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra ion of crashes by collision Severit Fatal and injury 0.013	0.044 shes with severity level C on type and crash sever ty level Fatal and injury ^a 0.018	(possible injury) rity level PDO 0.002	 Divided
Other Other OTE: ^a Using the KABCO are not included Collision type Head-on Sideswipe	0.053 scale, these include Proporti Total 0.006 0.043	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra on of crashes by collisie Severit Fatal and injury 0.013 0.027	0.044 shes with severity level C on type and crash sever ty level Fatal and injury ^a 0.018 0.022	(possible injury) rity level PDO 0.002 0.053	 Divided
Other OTE: ^a Using the KABCO are not included Collision type Head-on Sideswipe Rear-end	0.053 scale, these include Proporti Total 0.006 0.043 0.116	0.028 e only KAB accidents. Cra on of crashes by collisie Severit Fatal and injury 0.013 0.027 0.163	0.044 shes with severity level C on type and crash sever ty level Fatal and injury ^a 0.018 0.022 0.114	(possible injury) rity level PDO 0.002 0.053 0.088	 Divided


Default table for distribution of crash type.

	Annu	al Average Daily Traffic (AADT) (vehicle	es/day)
Shoulder Width	< 400	400 to 2000	> 2000
0-ft	1.10	1.10 + 2.5 x 10 ⁻⁴ (AADT - 400)	1.50
2-ft	1.07	1.07 + 1.43 x 10 ⁻⁴ (AADT - 400)	1.30
4-ft	1.02	1.02 + 8.125 x 10 ⁻⁵ (AADT - 400)	1.15
6-ft	1.00	1.00	1.00
8-ft or more	0.98	0.98 + 6.875 x 10 ⁻⁵ (AADT - 400)	0.87

CMF for variables not in base condition. Here is shoulder width example.




For intersections, two SPFs are introduced, they are slightly different in treating AADT.




Since the data used for model development is limited in AADT, it is important to point out the AADT limitations.

Crash Severity Lev	el a		b	с	Overdispersio parameter k
4ST total	-10.008		0.848	.448	0.494
4ST Fatal and inju	ry -11.554		0.888	0.525	0.742
4ST Fatal and injur	y* -10.734		0.828	0.412	0.665
3ST total	-12.526		1.204	0.236	0.460
3ST Fatal and inju	ry -12.664		1.107	0.272	0.569
3ST Fatal and Injury**	-11.989		1.013	0.228	0.566
Coefficients for 4	-leg Signalized I	nter	sections		
Crash Severity Level	а		b	с	verdispersion parameter k
4SG total	-9.025		1.049	1.549	0.277
4SG Fatal and injury	-8.837		0.958	1.687	0.218
*4SG Fatal and injury	-8.505		0.847	1.740	0.566

• Table of coefficients for intersection models



Intersection base condition




Ref: Highway Safety Manual, 1st Edition by AASHTO

			n-stop-controlled th left-turn lanes *
Intersection type	Crash Severity Level	One approach	Two approaches
Three-leg	Total	0.56	-
minor road STOP control ⁶	Fatal and Injury	0.45	-
Four-leg	Total	0.72	0.52
minor road STOP control ^b	Fatal and Injury	0.65	0.42
lanes	paches are not considered in determi minor road approaches only.	ining the number of app	roaches with left-turn

For variables not in base condition, use CMF.

			Proport	ion of crast	es by seve	rity level		
Collision type	Three-leg intersections with minor road stop control				Four-leg intersections with minor road stop control			
	Total	Fatal and injury	Fatal and injuryª	PDO	Total	Fatal and injury	Fatal and injuryª	PDO
Head-on	0.029	0.043	0.052	0.020	0.016	0.018	0.023	0.015
Sideswipe	0.133	0.058	0.057	0.179	0.107	0.042	0.040	0.156
Rear-end	0.289	0.247	0.142	0.315	0.228	0.213	0.108	0.240
Angle	0.263	0.369	0.381	0.198	0.395	0.534	0.571	0.292
Single	0.234	0.219	0.284	0.244	0.202	0.148	0.199	0.243
Other	0.052	0.064	0.084	0.044	0.051	0.046	0.059	0.055
Collision type	Three-leg signalized intersections				Four-leg signalized intersections			
	Total	Fatal and injury	Fatal and injury ^a	PDO	Total	Fatal and injury	Fatal and injury ^a	PDO
Head-on					0.054	0.083	0.093	0.034
Sideswipe					0.106	0.047	0.039	0.147
Rear-end					0.492	0.472	0.314	0.505
Angle					0.256	0.315	0.407	0.215
Single					0.062	0.041	0.078	0.077
Other					0.030	0.041	0.069	0.023

Table for default values on crash type distribution at intersections




Three chapters in the first edition of HSM deal with safety models for three types of highways.


Analysis Units					
	Two-lane undivided arterials (2U)				
	Three-lane arterials including a center two-way left-turn lane (TWLTL) (3T)				
Roadway	Four-lane undivided arterials (4U)				
Segment	Four-lane divided arterials (i.e., including a raised or depressed median) (4D)				
	Five-lane arterials including a center TWLTL (5T)				
	Unsignalized three-leg intersection (Stop control on minor-road approaches) (3ST)				
Intersections	Signalized three-leg intersections (3SG)				
	Unsignalized four-leg intersection (Stop control on minor-road approaches) (4ST)				
	Signalized four-leg intersection (4SG)				

Urban and Suburban Arterial Model is the most complicated model due to the roadways comprehensive safety performance.


Nine models do not cover all types of roads in urban and suburban roadways.




The SPF consists of three parts because pedestrian and bicycle traffic must be considered. It is time to remind students that 10% of total fatalities are pedestrians annually.



Even part one has three elements by crash types.




It is easy to get lost in this model, let's summarize the model again in equations.



	Coefficients used i	n Equation 12-10	Overdispersion
Road type	Intercept (a)	AADT (b)	parameter (k)
Total crashes			
2U	-15.22	1.68	0.84
3T	-12.40	1.41	0.66
4U	-11.63	1.33	1.01
4D	-12.34	1.36	1.32
5T	-9.70	1.17	0.81
Fatal-and-injury	y crashes		
20	-16.22	1.66	0.65
3T	-16.45	1.69	0.59
4U	-12.08	1.25	0.99
4D	-12.76	1.28	1.31
5T	-10.47	1.12	0.62
Property-dama	ge-only crashes		
20	-15.62	1.69	0.87
3T	-11.95	1.33	0.59
4U	-12.53	1.38	1.08
4D	-12.81	1.38	1.34
5T	-9.97	1.17	0.88


			Proportio	on of c r as	hes	by sever	ity level	for	specific re	oad types	5		
Collision	2	U	3	T		4	U		4	D		5	т
type	FI	PDO	FI	PDO		FI	PDO		FI	PDO		FI	PDO
Rear-end collision	0.730	0.778	0.845	0.842		0.511	0.506		0.832	0.662		0.846	0.651
Head-on collision	0.068	0.004	0.034	0.020		0.077	0.004		0.020	0.007		0.021	0.004
Angle collision	0.085	0.079	0.069	0.020		0.181	0.130		0.040	0.036		0.050	0.059
Sideswipe, same direction	0.015	0.031	0.001	0.078		0.093	0.249		0.050	0.223		0.061	0.248
Sideswipe, opposite direction	0.073	0.055	0.017	0.020		0.082	0.031		0.010	0.001		0.004	0.009
Other multiple- vehicle collisions	0.029	0.053	0.034	0.020		0.056	0.080		0.048	0.071		0.018	0.029




By now, model becomes self-explanatory.

_	<i>c l</i> (:		
Road type	Coefficients used i Intercept (a)	AADT (b)	Overdispersion parameter (k)
otal crashes			
2U	-5.47	0.56	0.81
3T	-5.74	0.54	1.37
4U	-7.99	0.81	0.91
4D	-5.05	0.47	0.86
5T	-4.82	0.54	0.52
Fatal-and-injur	y crashes		
2U	-3.96	0.23	0.50
3T	-6.37	0.47	1.06
4U	-7.37	0.61	0.54
4D	-8.71	0.66	0.28
5T	-4.43	0.35	0.36
Property-dama	ge-only crashes		
2U	-6.51	0.64	0.87
3T	-6.29	0.56	1.93
4U	-8.50	0.84	0.97
4D	-5.04	0.45	1.06
5T	-5.83	0.61	0.55


327






		Coefficients	for specific r	oadway type	s
Driveway type (j)	20	ЗТ	40	4D	5T
Number of driveway-related co	llisions per drive	eway per ye	ear (N _j)		-
Major commercial	0.158	0.102	0.182	0.033	0.165
Minor commercial	0.050	0.032	0.058	0.011	0.053
Major industrial/institutional	0.172	0.110	0.198	0.036	0.181
Minor industrial/institutional	0.023	0.015	0.026	0.005	0.024
Major residential	0.083	0.053	0.096	0.018	0.087
Minor residential	0.016	0.010	0.018	0.003	0.016
Other	0.025	0.016	0.029	0.005	0.027
Regression coefficient for ADT	(t)				-
All driveways	1.000	1.000	1.172	1.106	1.172
Overdispersion parameter (k)					
All driveways	0.81	1.10	0.81	1.39	0.10
Proportion of fatal-and-injury c	rashes (f _{dwy})				
All driveways	0.323	0.243	0.342	0.284	0.269
Proportion of property-damage	-only crashes				
All driveways	0.677	0.757	0.658	0.716	0.731

Coefficients for Multiple-Vehicle Driveway Related Collisions on Five Different Types of Roadway Segments




SPF	for Ve	ehicle-Bicycle	Collisions (pa	rt 3)
	100 4 100	$N_{bi \mathrm{ker}} = N_{mnv} + N_{brsv} + N_{brdvy} \times (CM_{biker} = bicycle accident)$	$F_{1r} \times CMF_{2r} \times \dots \times CMF_{5r})$	
-		Bicycle Accident Ad	ustment Factor (f _{biker})	'
	Road type	Posted Speed 30 mph or Lower	Posted Speed Greater than 30 mph	'
-	20	0.018	0.004	
	3T	0.027	0.007	
	4U	0.011	0.002	
_	4D	0.013	0.005	
	5T	0.050	0.012	
	bicycle collisio	apply to the methodology for predicting total ons resulting from this adjustment factor are tr age-only crashes. Source: HSIS data for Wash	eated as fatal-and-injury crashes and none as	




roportion of curb length with on-street parking ledian width (ft) - for divided only ghting (present / not present) Not	lone 15
ype of on-street parking (none/parallel/angle) roportion of curb length with on-street parking ledian width (ft) - for divided only ighting (present / not present) vto speed enforcement (present / not present) lajor commercial driveways (number) linor commercial driveways (number) lajor industrial / institutional driveways (number)	 15
roportion of curb length with on-street parking ledian width (ft) - for divided only ghting (present / not present) Not uto speed enforcement (present / not present) Not lajor commercial driveways (number) linor commercial driveways (number) lajor industrial / institutional driveways (number)	 15
ledian width (ft) - for divided only Not ighting (present / not present) Not uto speed enforcement (present / not present) Not lajor commercial driveways (number) Inor commercial driveways (number) lajor industrial / institutional driveways (number) Inor	
ghting (present / not present) Not uto speed enforcement (present / not present) Not lajor commercial driveways (number) Not linor commercial driveways (number) Image: State of the state of	
uto speed enforcement (present / not present) Not lajor commercial driveways (number) Inor commercial driveways (number) lajor industrial / institutional driveways (number) Inor commercial driveways (number)	
lajor commercial driveways (number) linor commercial driveways (number) lajor industrial / institutional driveways (number)	Present
linor commercial driveways (number) lajor industrial / institutional driveways (number)	Present
ajor industrial / institutional driveways (number)	
inor industrial / institutional driveways (number)	
lajor residential driveways (number)	-
linor residential driveways (number)	
ther driveways (number)	
peed Category	<u></u>
oadside fixed object density (fixed objects / mi)	0
ffset to roadside fixed objects (ft) [If greater than 30 or Not Present, input 30]	30

	CIV	1F for (On St	reet Pa	arking	3
	СМ	F = 1 +	$p_{pk}(f$	$f_{pk} = -1.0$)	
$p_{pk} = propo$ $L_{pk} = sum c$	ortion of a of curb le		n on-street p reet parking	arking = (0.5 Lpi for both sides o		ombined (miles)
			Type of parkin	g and land use		
	[Parallel pa	rking	Angle par	king	
	Road type	Residential/other	Commercial or industrial/	Residential/other	Commercial or industrial/	
			institutional		institutional	
	2U	1.465	2.074	3.428	institutional 4.853	
	2U 3T	1.465 1.465		3.428 3.428		
			2.074		4.853	
	3T	1.465	2.074 2.074	3.428	4.853 4.853	




For intersections there are also several parts.




	Coefficien	its used in Equati	on 12-21	Over-	-
Intersection type	Intercept (a)	AADT _{mai} (b)	AADT _{min} (c)	dispersion parameter (k)	
Total crashes			· [-
3ST	-13.36	1.11	0.41	0.80	-
3SG	-12.13	1.11	0.26	0.33	-
4ST	-8.90	0.82	0.25	0.40	-
4SG	-10.99	1.07	0.23	0.39	-
Fatal-and-injury crashes					-
3ST	-14.01	1.16	0.30	0.69	_
3SG	-11.58	1.02	0.17	0.30	
4ST	-11.13	0.93	0.28	0.48	_
4SG	-13.14	1.18	0.22	0.33	-
Property-damage-only cr	ashes	-			-
3ST	-15.38	1.20	0.51	0.77	_
3SG	-13.24	1.14	0.30	0.36	_
4ST	-8.74	0.77	0.23	0.40	_
4SG	-11.02	1.02	0.24	0.44	-


Coefficients for Multiple-Vehicle Collisions at Intersections



Intersection type	Coeffici Intercept (a)	AADT _{mai} (b)	AADT _{min} (c)	Over- dispersion parameter (k)
Total crashes		1 1		(,
3ST	-6.81	0.16	0.51	1.14
3SG	-9.02	0.42	0.40	0.36
4ST	-5.33	0.33	0.12	0.65
4SG	-10.21	0.68	0.27	0.36
Fatal-and-injury	crashes			
3ST				
3SG	-9.75	0.27	0.51	0.24
4ST				
4SG	-9.25	0.43	0.29	0.09
Property-damage	e-only crashes			
3ST	-8.36	0.25	0.55	1.29
3SG	-9.08	0.45	0.33	0.53
4ST	-7.04	0.36	0.25	0.54
4SG	-11.34	0.78	0.25	0.44



Ref: Highway Safety Manual, 1st Edition by AASHTO



Crash Severity Level	а	b	с	d	e	Overdispers parameter
3SG total	-6.60	0.05	0.24	0.41	0.09	0.52
4SG total	-9.53	0.40	0.26	0.45	0.04	0.25
	al level	_	stimate of PedVo Eq		ay) for use in	ian Activity
Gener of ped		Es	timate of PedVo	(pedestrians/d uation 12-29		ian Activity
Gener of ped acti	al level lestrian	Es	timate of PedVo Eq 3SG	(pedestrians/d uation 12-29	ay) for use in 4SG	ian Activity
Gener of ped acti Hi	al level lestrian ivity	Es	itimate of PedVol Eq 3SG tersections	(pedestrians/d uation 12-29	ay) for use in 4SG intersections	ian Activity
Gener of ped acti Hi Mediu	al level lestrian ivity	Es	stimate of PedVo Eq 3SG tersections 1,700	(pedestrians/d uation 12-29	ay) for use in 4SG intersections 3,200	ian Activity
Gener of ped acti Hi Mediu Mediu	al level lestrian ivity igh m-high	Es	stimate of PedVol Eq 3SG tersections 1,700 750	(pedestrians/d uation 12-29	4SG intersections 3,200 1,500	ian Activity

SPF for Vehicle-Pedestrian Collisions (Stop Controlled Intersection)

$$N_{_{pedi}} = N_{br} \times f_{pedi}$$

 $N_{bi} = (N_{bimv} + N_{bisv}) \times (CMF_{1r} \times CMF_{2r} \times ... \times CMF_{6r})$

Where, f_{pedi} = pedestrian accident adjustment factor.

3ST 0.021	
	0.022
4ST 0.022	0.011




$$N_{bikei} = N_{bi} \times f_{bikei}$$
$$N_{bi} = (N_{bimv} + N_{bisv}) \times (CMF_{1r} \times CMF_{2r} \times ... \times CMF_{6r})$$


Where, f_{bikei} = bicycle accident adjustment factor.

Intersection Type	$f_{\it bikei}$
3ST	0.016
3SG	0.011
4ST	0.018
4SG	0.015

LOUISIANA



Again, let's look at the safety models for urban and suburban roadways. For segments, there are five types and each type of segment; there are five collision types. For intersections, there are four types and each type of intersection; four types of collisions are considered.




Ata for unsignalized intersections only: Number of major-road approaches with left-turn lanes (0,1,2)	
Number of major-road approaches with right-turn lanes (0,1,2)	0
ata for signalized intersections only:	
Number of approaches with left-turn lanes (0,1,2,3,4) [for 3SG, use maximum value of 3]	0
Number of approaches with right-turn lanes (0,1,2,3,4) [for 3SG, use maximum value of 3]	0
Number of approaches with left-turn signal phasing [for 3SG, use maximum value of 3]	
Type of left-turn signal phasing for Leg #1	Permissive
Type of left-turn signal phasing for Leg #2	
Type of left-turn signal phasing for Leg #3	122
Type of left-turn signal phasing for Leg #4 (if applicable)	
Number of approaches with right-turn-on-red prohibited [for 3SG, use maximum value of 3]	0
Intersection red light cameras (present/not present)	Not Present
Sum of all pedestrian crossing volumes (PedVol) Signalized intersections only	
	v
Sum of all pedestrian crossing volumes (redvol) - Signalized intersections only Maximum number of lanes crossed by a pedestrian (n _{lanesx}) Number of bus stops within 300 m (1,000 ft) of the intersection Schools within 300 m (1,000 ft) of the intersection (present/not present) Number of alcohol sales establishments within 300 m (1,000 ft) of the intersection	 0 Not Present 0


CMF for Bus Stop	S	
# of bus stops within 1,000 ft. of the intersection	CMF	
0	1.00	
1 or 2	2.78	
3 or more	4.15	
		LOUISIANA Lafayette


Chapter 12 SPFs for Urban and Suburban Arterials	SPF Components by Collision type	SPF Equations and Exhibits
Roadway segments	multiple-vehicle nondriveway collisions	Equation 12-10, 12-11, 12-12, Exhibits 12-5, 12-6, 12-7
	single-vehicle crashes	Equations 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, Exhibits 12-8, 12-9, 12-10
	multiple-vehicle driveway- related collisions	Equations 12-16, 12-17, 12-18, Exhibits 12-11, 12-12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16
	vehicle-pedestrian collisions	Equation 12-19 Exhibit 12-17
	vehicle-bicycle collisions	Equation 12-20, Exhibit 12-18
Intersections	multiple-vehicle collisions	Equations 12-21, 12-22, 12-23, Exhibit 12-19, 12-20, 12-21, 12-22, 12-23, 12-24
	single-vehicle crashes	Equations 12-24, 12-25, 12-26, 12-27, Exhibit 12-25, 12-26, 12-27, 12-28, 12-29, 12-30
	vehicle-pedestrian collisions	Equations 12-28, 12-29, 12-30, Exhibits 12-31, 12-32, 12-33
	vehicle-bicycle collisions	Equation 12-31, Exhibit 12-34

A LL COR			AMF Equations and Exhibits
Applicable SPF	AMF AMF ₁	AMF Description On-Street Parking	Equation 12-32 and Exhibit 12- 36
Roadway Segments	AMF2,	Roadside Fixed Objects	Equation 12-33 and Exhibit 12- 37 and 12-38
	AMF _{3r}	Median Width	Exhibit 12-39
	AMF _%	Lighting	Equation 12-34 and Exhibit 12- 40
	AMF _{5r}	Automated Speed Enforcement	See text
	AMF1	Intersection Left-Turn Lanes	Exhibit 12-41
	AMF _{2i}	Intersection Left-Turn Signal Phasing	Exhibit 12-42
Multiple-vehicle collisions and	AMF ₃₁	Intersection Right-Turn Lanes	Exhibit 12-43
single-vehicle crashes at intersections	AMF∉	Right Turn on Red	Equation 12-35
	AMFs	Lighting	Equation 12-36 and Exhibit 12 44
	AMFG	Red Light Cameras	Equation 12-37, 12-38, 12-39
Vehicle- Pedestrian Collisions at Signalized Intersections	AMF _{1p}	Bus Stops	Exhibit 12-45
	AMF _{2p}	Schools	Exhibit 12-46
	AMF3p	Alcohol Sales Establishments	Exhibit 12-47





· Final summary for all models introduced in the first edition of HSM






The objective of this lecture is to let students understand the purpose and requirements for safety evaluation.






The purpose of this section is to explain the fundamentals of safety evaluation and to create an awareness of the challenges facing safety evaluation studies. The intent is also to enable student to form an opinion about the reliability and validity of the results of safety evaluations.


Emphasizing good technical skills in safety evaluation.




The effectiveness estimate for a project or treatment is a valuable piece of information for future safety decision-making and policy development.




Discuss the application of safety evaluation in the real world.




Let students participate in the discussion.






Remind students of the definition of safety.



Naïve methods were widely used 15 years ago even in some transportation textbooks.




There are many ways to predict the safety of, for example, an intersection or a road section.


Some approaches are better than others. The strengths and weaknesses of the main evaluation study types are described in this lecture.

In randomized controlled trials, roadways or facilities are randomly assigned to a treatment or control group.

The key characteristic of an observational study is that the selection of roadways or facilities which receive certain treatments is not random.




Randomized controlled trials are the "gold standard" for evaluation studies that can be conducted in controlled conditions such as a laboratory. The purpose of randomization is to ensure that the prediction accounts for all changes in safetyrelevant conditions, that the prediction is free of bias, and that the accuracy of results can be clearly stated. Although randomized controlled trials lead to the most defensible evaluation of the safety effects of a treatment, the randomized controlled trial study type is not common for road safety evaluations. Ask students why.




Ask students give examples on complete controlled studies they had in the past.




For these reasons, researchers can not design experiments, for example, roadway lane width or shoulder width, to evaluate the safety of roadway design element.




Thus, a big challenge for researchers in highway safety is to work with imperfect information.



Looking the research published 30 years ago and seeing the popularity of naïve methods in roadway safety evaluation. Safety evaluation is truly an evolved process.



The potential for confounding exists in observational before-after studies when changes in safety-relevant conditions from the "before" to the "after" period, i.e., the untreated to the treated period, are not accounted for in the prediction of safety. To simply compare accident counts on the roadway from "before" and "after" the treatment assumes that either all the safety-relevant conditions remained constant or that their impact on safety is negligible.




Again on RTM: It is important for students get RTM before the end of this course and forward.


Method Naïve B-A (no longer acceptable)	Confounding factor Not considered	Account for RTM No
(no longer	Not	
(no longer		No
	considered	
B-A with Comparison Group	that the change in crashes of the comparison group of roadways or facilities predicts the safety of the treated roadways or facilities if they were not treated	No
B-A with Explicit Corrections	Accounts explicitly for known changes in traffic and possibly for other safety relevant conditions.	No, but it can be minimized by using multiple years of data
B-A with EB (must have carefully developed SPF)	correct for changes that occurred in both measured and unmeasured safety relevant conditions between the before and after periods	Yes
	Group B-A with Explicit Corrections B-A with EB must have carefully	Comparison Grouproadways or facilities predicts the safety of the treated roadways or facilities if they were not treatedB-A with Explicit CorrectionsAccounts explicitly for known changes in traffic and possibly for other safety relevant conditions.B-A with EB must have carefully leveloped SPF)correct for changes that occurred in both measured and unmeasured safety relevant conditions

The first and simplest type of observational before-after study has a high potential for confounding as the safety effect of the treatment cannot be separated from the safety effect of other conditions. The naïve or simple B-A study type does not account for regression-to-mean.


The second study type is the before-after with comparison group study. This study type seeks to reduce the potential for confounding by using the before and after accident counts of a comparison (untreated) group of roadways or facilities. The assumption is that the safety-relevant conditions of the treated roadways or facilities changed from before to after in the same way as the comparison group of roadways or facilities. This assumption is unlikely and generally difficult to confirm for important safety-relevant conditions. For example, it is unlikely that traffic in the treated group of roadways or facilities changed in the same way as in the untreated group of roadways or facilities. However, if it can be shown that all safety-relevant conditions changed in the treated group of roadways or facilities just as in the comparison group, then the safety prediction is the "safety of the treatment group before treatment" multiplied by the comparison ratio. The comparison ratio is defined as the "safety of the comparison group after treatment" divided by the "safety of the comparison group before treatment." Another difficulty of this study type occurs when the number of accidents in the comparison group is small, resulting in an inaccurate comparison ratio. The B-A with comparison group study type does not account for regression-to-mean.




Comparison groups used in before/after evaluations have traditionally consisted of non-treated sites that are comparable in traffic volume, geometrics, and other site characteristics to the treated sites, but without the specific improvement being installed





It is desired data requirements. Oftentimes, evaluation has to be done on a single site.




The results of such evaluations, even for a single site, may be of interest to highway agencies in monitoring their improvement programs. However, results from the evaluation of a single site will not be very accurate and, with only one site available, the precision and statistical significance of the evaluation results cannot be assessed.










- Estimating the expected crashes in the before period for each site with EB method
- Estimating the expected crashes in the after period for each site with EB method
- Calculating the differences (effectiveness) between before and after periods
- Estimating precision of the effectiveness






For example, it is unlikely that an agency has many rural two-lane road segments where horizontal curvature was rebuilt to increase the horizontal curve radius. However, it is likely that an agency has many rural two-lane road segments with horizontal curvature in a certain range, such as 1500 to 2000 ft. (450 to 600 m) range, and another group of segments with curvature in another range, such as 3000 to 5000 ft. (900 to 1500 m). These two groups of rural two-lane road segments could be used in a cross-section study.








Selection Guide for Observational									
Evaluation Methods									
Treatment sites data		Non-treatment sites data		SPF models	Suitable Method				
Before	After	Before	After		Method				
Х	Х			Х	B-A with EB				
Х	Х	Х	Х		B-A comparison				
х	х				B-A with Explicit Corrections				
	Х		Х		Cross-sectional				
				1					



Let's learn the skills.








Speed limit had been traditionally the responsibility of the states since 1901.

Congress directed the USDOT to withhold highways funding from states that did not adopt a 55 mph speed limit responding to the oil shortage of 1973.

In response to claims that 55 mph limit had made the United States a nation of law breakers and assertion that accidents would not increase because people were already traveling at the speeds at which they felt comfortable, Congress allowed state to increase the limit on rural interstates to 65 mph in 1987.


The National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 replaced the maximum speed limit, allowing states to set their own limits for the first time since 1974. Many states quickly moved to raise speed limit on both rural and urban interstates and limited access roads. As of July 2000, 29 states had raised speed limit to 70 mph or higher on some portion of their highway systems.







Based 1996 and 1998 traffic crash records, Dr. Schneider's report of Analysis of the impact of increased Speed Limit on Interstate and on Highways in Louisiana" has revealed that while the # of fatal crashes increase by less than 1% in Louisiana, the fatal crash on interstate increased 37% during the same period of time.

Elevated interstates with speed limit of 70 mph had a 160% increase in fatal crashes, 134% increase in injury crashes and a 42% increase in POD crashes.











			I	B-A	stu	die	S			
Sin	gle	site l	3-A 9	study	with	n exp	licit	corre	ectio	ns
 Comparison B-A study with explicit 										
00	corrections									
	•									
	•									
	•									
CO	rrec	tions	Fatal				Truck	Average	Fatal	
CO Period	rec	tions	Fatal Crashes	Fatalities	AADT	Crashes	Truck Crashes	Average AADT	Fatal crashes	Fatalities
CO Period	Year 2000	Crashes	Fatal Crashes 1	1	33,939		Crashes	AADT	crashes	
CO	Year 2000 2001	Crashes	Fatal Crashes 1 0	1 0	33,939 39,271	Crashes				Fatalities
CO Period	Year 2000 2001 2002	Crashes 128 192 217	Fatal Crashes 1 0 1	1 0 1	33,939	537	Crashes	AADT 37,542	crashes 2	2
CO Period	Year 2000 2001	Crashes	Fatal Crashes 1 0	1 0	33,939 39,271 39,415		Crashes 81	AADT	crashes	
CO Period	Year 2000 2001 2002 2003	Crashes 128 192 217 101	Fatal Crashes 1 0 1 2	1 0 1 6	33,939 39,271 39,415 40,918	537	Crashes 81	AADT 37,542	crashes 2	2

Â	Single site B-A study with explicit corrections								
		Crashes	Average AADT						
	3 years before	537	37,416						
	3 years after	509	40,802						
				<u>1V ERSITY</u> UISIANA					












Comparison B-A study with explicit corrections

 Louisiana has five elevated freeways including Atchafalaya I-10. They are: I-10 over the Bonnet Carre Spillway (milepost 210 to 221.5); I-10 New Orleans East Twin Spans (milepost 255.4 to 261.3); I-55 over the Manchac Swamp (milepost 0 to 23) and I-310 over the Labranche Wetlands (milepost 0 to 5).


LOUISIANA










Year	Atchafalaya	Other four elevated highways	0 _i	m(o)	s²{o}
2000	128	359			
2001	192	393	0.724	1.176	0.204
2002	217	433	0.968	1.176	0.043
2004	161	523	1.614	1.176	0.192
2005	170	556	0.999	1.176	0.031
2006	178	923	1.574	1.176	0.158
Average	174	531			0.126
VÂR{Ż	î} = 509	$\hat{VAR}\{\omega\} = 0.1106$	VÂR{	$\hat{\pi}$ } = 95,3	311






	S	ummar	γ							
	Summary									
E	Reduction in Expected Number of Crashes	Reduction in % of Crashes	Reduction in Expected Truck Crashes	Reduction in % of Truck Crashes						
B-A (one site)	77 (35)	13% (6%)	69 (11)	79% (5%)						
B-A with comparison Group	398 (307)	50% (15.4%)	30 (38)	64% (12%)						





In Louisiana, there are 1,530 miles of undivided multilane roadways and most of them are four-lane highways on the state Department of Transportation and Development System (DOTD). Ninety-three percent of these roadways are in urban and suburban areas.




Louisiana has established policies discouraging five-lane roadway design in constructing new roads, and seldom considers it as an option in reducing crashes on undivided multilane roadways. There is no CMF listed in the first edition of the HSM for converting four-lane undivided roadway to TWLTL, and very few studies were conducted on the impact of such conversions in the past.


Solutions?


 Inexpensive option: with sufficient pavement width, a four-lane undivided highway can also be easily changed to a five-lane roadway with the center lane for left-turns, which expectedly reduces rear-end


collisions.














South College Road, part of a state route named LA3025, experienced the typical safety problems of undivided multilane roadways. It is located inside the city of Lafayette and is functioning as an arterial street. With an Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) around 28,000 in 2009, the majority of vehicles on the segment are through traffic.

	District	Control Section	Length (mi)	Installation Year	No. of Driveways	Location
LA 3025	D3	828-23	1.228	2003	30	Lafayette
LA 182	D3	032-02	1	2007	50	Opelousas
LA 1138	D7	810-06	1.07	1999	50	Lake Charles
LA 28	D8	074-01	0.92	2005	20	Alexandria






Rate Rate		Bef	Before After		ter	Percenta	Percentage Change	
A3025 358 10.05 147 4.59 -59% -54.309		Crashes	Crash	Crashes	Crash	Crashes	Crash Rate	
	LA3025	358	10.05	147	4.59	-59%	-54.30%	
A182 178 8.12 85 3.53 -52% -51.309	LA182	178	8.12	85	3.53	-52%	-51.30%	
LA28 206 7.38 99 4.09 -52% -45%	LA28	206	7.38	99	4.09	-52%	-45%	
A1138 260 16.01 167 10.63 -36% -34%	LA1138	260	16.01	167	10.63	-36%	-34%	



Since simply comparing crash frequencies before and after a crash countermeasure implementation does not account for the changes in traffic volume and, most importantly, the stochastic nature of crashes, the analysis was conducted based on the principle that the true impact of a crash countermeasure should be the difference between the predicted safety after the crash countermeasure implementation and the predicted safety in the after period if the crash countermeasure were not implemented. Ideally, the predicted expected safety should be calculated by the Empirical Bayes (EB) method with a rigorously developed and carefully calibrated safety performance function. Since the models in Chapter 12 of the HSM for the two types of roadways are not calibrated with Louisiana data, the following "four-step" procedure introduced by Hauer (5) was used to estimate a crash modification factor for the re-striping projects assuming crashes following Poisson probability distribution. For this analysis, the actual number of crashes was used for the "predicted" crashes after the crash countermeasure implementation. The details of the safety estimation are summarized as follows...



Step 1: Estimating the safety if the re-striping were not installed during the after period, $\hat{\lambda}$ and the safety with re-striping project $\hat{\pi}$

$$\hat{\lambda} = N$$
$$\hat{\pi} = \hat{r}_{tf} K$$

	â	Âavg	B avg	Po	$\hat{\pi}$
LA 3025	147	23,888	26,580	0.90	322
LA 182	85	21,947	20,067	1.09	195
LA 28	99	26,115	25,570	1.02	210
LA 1138	167	13,540	13,870	0.98	254
LA 1156	107	15,540	15,870	0.98	254
					UNIVE

Step Two: Estimating $VAR{\hat{\lambda}}$ and $VAR{\hat{\pi}}$

 $\hat{VAR}\{\hat{\lambda}\} = L$

$$VAR\{\hat{\lambda}\} = L$$
$$\hat{VAR}\{\hat{\pi}\} = (r_d)^2 [(\hat{r}_{tf})^2 K + K^2 \hat{VAR}\{\hat{r}_{tf}\}]$$

Where:

 $V\hat{A}R\{\hat{r}_{if}\} = r_{if}^{2} (v^{2}\{\hat{A}_{avg}\} + v^{2}\{\hat{B}_{avg}\})$ $v\hat{A}R\{\hat{z}\} = \text{estimated variance of the estimated expected number of crashes}$ in the after period,

v = the percent coefficient of variance for AADT estimates,

v = 1 + 7.7/ (number of count - days) + 1650/AADT^{0.082}


 $v\hat{A}R(\hat{\pi})$ = estimated variance of the estimated expected number of accidents in the "after" period if DSL were not used.

	$VAR \{\hat{\lambda}\}$	$VAR \{\hat{\pi}\}$	$v{A_{avg}}$	$v\{B_{avg}\}$	VAR(Py)
LA 3025	147	616	0.0398	0.0395	0.0025
LA 182	85	337	0.0430	0.0425	0.0039
LA 28	99	354	0.0396	0.0397	0.0032
LA 1138	167	479	0.0423	0.0424	0.0034


Step Three	: Estimating	the differer	nce $\hat{\delta}$ and	the ratio $\hat{ heta}$
	-	$\hat{\hat{\sigma}} = \hat{\pi} - \hat{\lambda}$		
	$\hat{ heta}$ =	$=(\hat{\lambda}/\hat{\pi})/[1+$	$VAR{\hat{\pi}}/\hat{\pi}^2$	²]
Where	ŝ – ostima	ited safety impact	t of DSI	
	$\hat{ heta}$ = estima		ected crash modi	fication factor
		ŝ	θ	1
	LA 3025	175	0.45	1
	LA 182	110	0.43	1
	LA 28	111	0.47	1
	LA 1138	87	0.65	1
			•	UNIVERSITY LOUISIANA


Step Four: Estimatin	a the variance	of $\hat{\delta}$ and $\hat{0}$	
Step Four. Estimatin			
άſ	$\hat{\delta}$ = $\sqrt{VA\hat{R}\{\hat{\pi}\}+VA}$		
	$O_{j} = \sqrt{2} M(n_{j} + 2)$	n (n)	
	$\hat{\theta}_{\lambda} V \hat{A} R\{\hat{\lambda}\} / \hat{\lambda}^2 + (V, V)$	$\hat{A}R\{\hat{\pi}\}/\hat{\pi}^2$	
$\hat{\sigma}\{\hat{ heta}\}$	$=\frac{\hat{\theta}\sqrt{\hat{VAR}\{\hat{\lambda}\}/\hat{\lambda}^2}+(V_A)}{(1+\hat{VAR}\{\hat{\pi}\})}$	⁴²)	
	$(1 + VAR{\pi})/$	π^{-})	
		-	
	$\hat{\sigma}\{\hat{\delta}\} = \sqrt{\operatorname{var}(ance)}$	$\hat{\sigma}\{\hat{\theta}\} = \sqrt{\text{var}(ance)}$	
LA 3025	27.62	0.051	
LA 182	20.53	0.062	
LA 28	21.28	0.062	
LA 1138	25.42	0.075	
	3. 9794722223 3.		
			SIAN
		Lafa;	y e 1


Result	s of the	Analys	is	
	Expected Crash Reduction	Standard Deviation	Estimated CMF or (CRF)	Standard Deviation
LA3025	175	27.62	0.45 (0.55)	0.051
LA182	110	20.53	0.43 (0.57)	0.062
LA28	111	21.28	0.47 (0.53)	0.062
LA1138	87	25.42	0.65 (0.35)	0.075





The crash modification factors derived from the before-and-after crashes analysis of the re-striping projects is striking: Crash countermeasures, as listed in the first edition of the HSM, seldom yield CMF values smaller than 0.5. The estimated CMF and standard deviation on both roadway segments indicate a certainty that a re-striping project reduces crashes since the estimated CMF plus the three standard deviations is still much less than one (0.60 for LA3025 and 0.62 for LA182). The annual crashes on LA3025 in 2008, 2009 and 2010 further confirm the sustainable effectiveness of the crash countermeasure even though the segment experienced a 10 percent increase in the average AADT from the 2004-2006 period to 2008-2010.
















Crashes	LA3025			LA182		LA28			LA1138			
by Severity	Before	After	% Change	Before	After	% Change	Before	After	% Change	Befo re	After	% Change
Total	358	147	-58.90%	178	85	-52.30%	206	99	-51.94%	260	167	-35.77%
PDO	277	105	-62.10%	124	63	-49.20%	148	76	-48.68%	172	119	-30.81%
Injury Crashes	81	40	-50.60%	54	22	-59.30%	58	23	-60.34%	88	48	-45.45%
Fatal	0	2	increase	0	0	0%	0	0	0%	0	0	0%





While nothing was changed except the lane configuration on LA3025, there was a speed limit reduction (from 50 mph to 45 mph) on 44% of LA182 segment after the re-striping project. Without collecting speed data before and after the re-striping project and not having speeding enforcement cameras on this segment, the impact of speed limit change on operating speed is not clear. However, the numerous past studies on speed have shown that operating speed is seldom controlled by speed limit unless enforcement is present; and speed change has no statistically significant effect on crash frequency but does associate with crash severity. It is possible that the higher percentage of injury reduction on LA182 (comparing to the one on LA3025) could be somewhat associated with the speed limit change.


•	Benefit/Cost Ratio Benefit—saving from reduced crashes 								
٠	Cost – strip	Severity	y L	A 3025	LA 182 LA 28		LA 1138		
	N.4.:	Level	Re						
•	Minimum E	PDO			61	72	53		
		Injury		41	32	35	40		
	Segment Total Benefits			Total	tal Cost (\$) B/C Ratio				
	LA 3025		14	,100		195			
	LA 182		11	11,50016610,600199		166			
	LA 28 2,110,212 LA 1138 2,317,488					10	199		
				12,300			188		
							4	UNIVERSITY LOUISIANA	

The cost of re-striping a roadway per mile covering both materials and labor is about \$7,105 by the maintenance crew of the DOTD District Office or \$11,450 by outside contract. Based on the Federal Highway Administration estimation the average cost for an injury crash is \$24,390, and for a PDO is \$3,730; this yields a benefit to cost (B/C) ratio of **88** for the LA182 segment if using an outside contract (assuming the paint lasts about three years). This is the most conservative B/C ratio: it would be larger if maintenance crew costs were used for the LA182 project and much larger if the LA3025 crash data were used.














APPENDIX B: EVALUATION PACKAGE















		Answer the following questions	to the best	of vour knowledge
				. ,
1.		number of 2012 traffic fatalities in the is about:		h of the following are included in the ional 4Es of roadway safety?
	a.	100,000	a.	Engineering, enforcement, education, and environment
	b. c.	500 4,500	b.	Engineering, enforcement, education, and emergency response
	d.	37,000	с.	Engineering, enforcement, education, and economic development
2.	High a. b.	way Safety is a: Public health problem Economic problem	d.	Engineering, enforcement, emergency response and everyone else
	с.	Liability problem		ypical day, more people are killed in the
	d.	All of the above	Unite	d State by:
			a.	Traffic crashes
3.	Over	the past 50 years the traffic fatality	b.	Flood
	rate i	in the U.S. has	с.	Fire
	a.	Remained fairly constant	d.	Criminal actions
	b.	Increased slowly.		
	с.	Declined a little.		of the following roadway type has the
	d.	Declined substantially.	highest tr	raffic fatality rate in the U.S.?
			a.	Freeway
4.	The U.S. national average fatality rate in		b.	Multilane highway
	recent years is close to:		с.	Rural 2-lane highway
	a.	2.0	d.	Urban 2-lane highway
	b.	1.5		
	с.	0.1		
	d.	0.9		

- 1. d
- 2. d
- 3. d
- 4. d
- 5. B
- 6. A
- 7. C

7

	Quiz	Τv	vo		
	Answer the following question	s to t	he be	st of your knowledge	
1.	Which of the following safety measures is	5.	Wha	t is RTM in crash analysis?	
	preferred from a science-based perspective?		a.	Rapid traffic management	
	 The level of comfort you feel as a driver. 		b.	Release to manufacturing	
	b. The level of crash risk for all travelers.		с.	Risky transportation mode	
	c. The number of fatalities occurring on the roadways.		d.	Regression to the mean	
	 The number of crashes expected to occur on a highway facility during a specific period of time. 				
2.	Roadway safety should be evaluated by:		Which of the following statements is not commonly used in roadway safety		
	 Headline stories. 		a.	Crash rate is calculated by number of crashes per	
	b. Personal observation.		а.	one million VMT	
	c. Careful statistical analysis		b.	Fatality rate is calculated by fatalities per 100	
	 Political expediency. 			million VMT	
			с.	Crash rate for intersection is calculated by crashe	
3.	Which age group has the highest traffic fatality rate?		d.	per million entering vehicles Fatality rate is the % of fatalities occurred annual	
	a. 30 to 40				
	b. 40 to 50	7.	Road	lway safety should be evaluated by:	
	c. Younger than 20	•		Usedline station	
	d. Older than 70		a. b.	Headline stories. Personal observation.	
	e. C and D		D. C.	Careful statistical analysis	
	f. A and B		d.	Political expediency.	
4.	Objective safety is:				
	 Quantifiable and independent of observer. 				
	b. Defined by design specifications.				
	c. Perceptive.				
	d. Personal experience oriented.				


- 1. d
- 2. c
- 3. e
- 4. a
- 5. d
- 6. d
- 7. c



- 1. a
- 2. a
- 3. d
- 4. a
- 5. b

	Quiz		
	Answer the following question	ns to i	the best of your knowledge
1.	 In general, the relationship between crash frequency and AADT is: Linear, as AADT increases, crash frequency increases. Non-linear, as AADT increases, crash frequency increases. Linear, as AADT increases, crash frequency decreases. Non-Linear, as AADT increases, crash frequency decreases. 		Why randomized controlled experiments (called gold standard for evaluation) cannot be used in roadway safety evaluation? Because they are: a. Not scientific. b. Requiring too much data. c. Taking too much data. d. Not practical and inducing liability problems.
2.	What does EDA stand for in safety model development process? a. Electronic Data Access b. Exploratory Data Analysis c. Electronic Design Automation d. Economic Development Administration	6.	 Which of the following is not correct about safety modeling? a. A safety model development is not a pre-defined process b. It is a gradual progress towards a satisfactory result consisting of steps and missteps.
3.	The safety model parameters (coefficients) estimation depends on: a. Selection of objective function. b. Selection of functional form. c. Selection of variables. d. All of the above e. None of the above	7.	 c. It does not need sufficient data as long as the right variables are selected d. The model parameters depend on the selection of objective functions For three types of roadways introduced in the HSM SPF chapters, the two basic safety analysis units are: a. Curves and tangent
4.	Safety evaluation, a central element of safety research, is the use of data to quantify the following: a. Safety effects of enforcement actions b. Safety effects of roadway improvements		 a. Conversion tangent b. Segment and intersection c. Segment with curve and segment without curve d. Stop sign controlled intersection and signalized intersection
	c. Safety effects of traffic control devices d. All of the above		

- 1. b
- 2. b
- 3. d
- 4. d
- 5. d
- 6. c
- 7. b



APPENDIX C: SYLLABUS FOR COMPREHENSIVE SAFETY COURSE

Department of Civil Engineering

Course Syllabus: Highway Safety

- 1. Course Number & Name: Highway Safety
- 2. Credits & Contact Hours: 3 credit hours, 3 lecture hours

3. Instructor's Name:

4. Textbook: No

5. Important References:

- **Observational Before-After Studies in Road Safety** by E. Hauer, Emerald Group Publishing Limited (February 1, 1997).
- *Highway Safety Manual*, 1st Edition by AASHTO
- o Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), 2009 Edition by FHWA
- o Roadside Safety Design Guide by AASHTO
- Human Factors Guidelines for Road Systems by National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP)

6. Specific Course Information

a. Catalog Description:

Introduction to highway safety, fundamentals of safety analysis, highway safety management systems, safe highway design and operation, human factor in highway safety and highway safety modeling.

b. Course prerequisite:

Graduate student and senior status in Civil Engineering

7. Course Specific Goals:

- a. Mastering the fundamental knowledge of highway safety and being able to explain roadway traffic crash characteristics
- b. Understanding roadway safety design concepts (consistency and forgiving)
- c. Being able to apply predictive highway safety models to evaluate safety of a particular roadway facility (intersection, segment, interchange) safety under various design and traffic control conditions
- d. Being able to perform network screening and diagnostic analysis for highway safety management systems
- e. Understanding human factors in highways safety

8. Brief List of Course Topics:

1. Introduction to highway safety

Department of Civil Engineering

- Highway Crashes- an Underemphasized Problem
- Highway Safety a Complex Field
- Introduction to the 4E approach
- 2. Highway safety fundamentals
 - Basic Safety Concepts
 - Safety Measurement
 - Safety Predictive Models
 - SPF in HSM
 - Safety Evaluation
- 3. Application of IHSDM program
- 4. Safety Management System Process
 - Network Screening
 - Diagnosis
 - Select Countermeasures
 - Economic Appraisal
 - Priorities project
 - Safety Effectiveness
- 5. Human Factor
 - Introduction human factors
 - Driving task model
 - Basic road users characteristics and limitation
 - i. Visual
 - ii. Mental
 - iii. Expectancy
 - iv. Speed perception and choice
 - Human factors in positive guidance and road design
- 6. Highway safety design
 - New safe roadway design concept
 - Forgiving roadside design
 - Geometric design
 - Intersection and interchange design
 - Access management
 - Pedestrian and bicycle safety design
- 9. Grading Policy: Homework 30% Two Exams 40% Projects 30%